Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: chugins@cup.hp.com (Chris Hugins) Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part One Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:35 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was sgastete@u.washington.edu ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:05:34 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere Chaired By: Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca) Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj) Witnesses: Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters, Thomas Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building Washington, Dc REP. LANTOS: Before turning to our distinguished witnesses, let me just make two observations. I identify myself in very strong measure with the comments of my distinguished colleague and friend, Chairman Torricelli, but I would like to observe that some of the comments from the Republican side would make it appear that we have had a brilliant and successful anti-drug strategy for 12 years, and suddenly in the last 18 months we have fallen down on the job, and the record will surely not support that. The drug problem in the United States did not begin on January 20th of 1993. Our anti-drug strategy with respect to the hemisphere did not begin -- whatever it is -- 16 months ago -- and just as the problem of the whole drug complex is not a partisan problem, I would hope that my colleagues will approach it in a somewhat less partisan fashion that what we have seen in the last few minutes. We will ask our distinguished witnesses to make concise opening statements. Your prepared presentations will be entered in the record in their entirety. We will first hear from the assistant secretary for international narcotics matters, the Honorable Robert Gelbard. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. We appreciate your concise approach at the outset so we can get to questions. There will be plenty of questions. MR. GELBARD: Thank you very much. Chairman Lantos, Chairman Torricelli, Congressman Smith, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today with Mr. Constantine and Mr. Sheridan. Let me thank you from the outset for agreeing to reschedule this hearing. I understand the demands on the committee's time and the problems caused by a last-minute postponement. I hope that by the end of today's hearing, we will all agree that we were better served by waiting this past week. As you requested, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my full prepared statement for the record. REP. LANTOS: Without objection. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to talk today about perceptions. I ask you to take a step back and look at the world through the eyes of the narcotics trafficker. Unfortunately, it doesn't look so bad, and some trends are moving his way. In some countries, including our own, the trafficker is once again hearing the sweet -- to him -- and misleading sounds of debate over legalization. In Colombia, the prosecutor-general, Gustavo Degrave (ph) has negotiated soft deals with leaders of the Cali Cartel, sometimes bargaining away evidence that we have provided in the process. In Bolivia, evidence is now coming to light that the previous government was deeply penetrated by traffickers. Closer to home, last year the budget of every -- REP. LANTOS: May I stop you there? You say deeply penetrated. How high was it penetrated? MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I was ambassador to Bolivia during the time of much of that government. Certainly members of the cabinet -- some members of the cabinet were involved, and at my insistence, the president of Bolivia fired the minister of the interior, Guillermo Capobianco (ph), who was deeply involved in accepting trafficker money, as was the head of the national police, and we believe there are others. This is currently an issue under investigation by the Bolivian Congress, so I would rather not enter into any specifics on this respecting their prerogatives. REP. LANTOS: Thank you. MR. GELBARD: Last year the budget of every United States government agency dedicated to international counternarcotics was dramatically reduced. My own bureau's budget dropped 30 percent, with even deeper cuts to military and economic support funds supporting our counternarcotics efforts. We are reducing staff at several narcotics affairs sections overseas.. This year's budget picture is no brighter. Thanks in part to the efforts of some members of this committee, the House appropriation for international counternarcotics restores some of last year's cuts. The Senate bill, however, leaves us at last year's skeleton level, well below the president's request. Mr. Chairman, let me be blunt. I cannot do the job that you expect of me and the secretary of state asks of me if I do not have adequate resources. If we take another year of major funding cuts, then something has to go. Perhaps we will slash sustainable development programs in the Andes and close other programs altogether. We might be forced to reduce support for eradication programs and generally cut back our aviation support. Unquestionably, we would have difficulty funding new programs whether targeted against the growing United States' heroin epidemic or against organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe. I do not mean to put a gun against my own head and threaten to pull the trigger if Congress does not vote us a larger budget, but it is important to acknowledge in advance that these sorts of cuts will have direct and explicit consequences. The truth is that we do have a good story to tell about international counternarcotics programs. We are paying a price today for some unfortunate rhetoric in the past. Efforts against drugs are not a war that we will win in two, three or four years. Success or failure is not tabulated on an accountant's data sheet of arrests, seizures and current street price. The struggle against drugs is the work of a generation, not of a statistician. Last year, we developed a new counternarcotics strategy for the Western Hemisphere. It addresses the twin concerns confronting this administration and this Congress in January of 1993: the perception that the past strategy was not working and the need to reduce budgets. The new strategy calls for a gradual shift in emphasis from transit interdiction to source country efforts. It calls for us to support stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in source countries and to integrate counternarcotics into global alternative development strategy. It seeks greater involvement by international and multinational organizations and continued efforts against entire trafficker organizations. In short, the new strategy seeks to reinforce what we have seen that works, coordinate and consolidate among multiple programs to ensure efficiency, and engage international organizations that previously had shied away from involvement in counternarcotics. The president's new strategy called for us to use the narcotics certification process energetically as an antidrug tool. On April 1st, the president's certification decisions put substance behind the words. Ten of the 26 countries were denied certification or granted it only on the basis of a vital national interest certification. This was an honest process. These were not just pariah nations with whom we have no serious bilateral interests. Nigeria, Bolivia and Peru had never before received anything less than full certification. Panama and Laos did not receive full certification, despite serious and important U.S. concerns outside of narcotics issues. The president's certification decision sent a very clear signal. Business as usual is no longer good enough. We will bear our burden in the world-wide struggle against drugs, but we expect the same commitment from our fellow governments. I might add that the certification provisions, currently codified in Section 489 and 490 of the foreign Assistance Act, are scheduled to expire on September 30th. I hope this committee will work with us to retain this very important weapon in the struggle against drugs. Finally, let me address the Andean narcotics issue that is probably foremost in your minds. As you know, the United States government has frozen assistance and intelligence sharing with Colombia and Peru that could be used for targeting civil aircraft. We have done so because of those government's announced policies of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey orders to land. REP. LANTOS: Just to get the record straight. How many actual shoot-downs took place by the Peruvians? MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain as to numbers. We -- MR. GELBARD: Can anyone else on the panel give us the answer? Mr. Sheridan? MR. SHERIDAN: I believe that we're talking in the range of three, four, five perhaps. REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman I'm told the answer is 31. MR. GELBARD: But, let me ask how you're defining the -- REP. TORRICELLI: When a plane hits the ground is a shoot-down. MR. GELBARD: The Peruvians deny that they have ever shot down an aircraft. . REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah. I'm told the number is 31. Even when I met with them last it was in excess of 20. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, do you have any entry in this sweepstakes? --(Laughter.) . MR. CONSTANTINE: None, whatsoever.. REP. LANTOS: Well, it would be sort of nice to have our three top experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably elementary question. So let me get back to you, Secretary Gelbard --. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman -- REP. LANTOS: With this coaching from Congressman Torricelli, what number would you -- MR. GELBARD: I -- I'm afraid I have to differ with Congressman Torricelli's estimate. The Colombian government has told us that since they announced their policy early this year they have not shot down any aircraft. And the Peruvian government told us in the course of the meetings that I held with them, when I led delegation to both Colombia and Peru last week, they say that they have not shot down any aircraft. They have -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me -- what do you expect them to say? If they admit that they're shooting down aircraft, you suspend cooperation and sharing information with them. Of course they're going to tell you they're not shooting down any aircraft. But indeed when you meet with them privately and to their own people they're giving the number of 31. It is indeed accurate that Colombians do not acknowledge shooting down anyone, but the Peruvians are a very different story. MORE. I don't know how you could expect a different answer than the one you're receiving, given your pledge to cease operations with them if they give you a different answer. It would be amazing if they said anything differently. MR. GELBARD: Well, with respect, Mr. Chairman, the Peruvian government and the Colombian government have both made it very clear to me that they do not intend to renounce their policy, their stated policy of having the capability of going after aircraft and shooting at or shooting down such aircraft. But they still stated that they have not shot aircraft down. Now, what they have done, and I've seen videotapes that corroborate this, they have shot at aircraft and hit wing tips or other nonvital parts of aircraft, and as a result, those aircraft have landed under their own power. REP. LANTOS: How many such incidents are we aware of where force was used even though it was not decisive? MR. GELBARD: We believe there are perhaps slightly more than a dozen, perhaps around 15. REP. LANTOS: In Peru? MR. GELBARD: Yes. REP. LANTOS: How about Colombia? MR. GELBARD: As I said, I don't believe that they have shot at any aircraft since their stated policy has been put into place earlier this year. MR. SHERIDAN: And let me -- if I could, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that, when I gave a number of somewhere around five, I was defining the issue similar to Ambassador Gelbard, which would mean they fired at weapons but have not shot any out of the sky and caused a crash landing. I meant that they had fired weapons at and perhaps caused some damaged aircraft, but those aircraft landed under their own power. And I think five, 10, somewhere in there is the appropriate number. REP. TORRICELLI: If we are, though, Mr. Chairman, defining this as firing at aircraft rather than downing aircraft, then the conclusion that the Colombians are not engaged in this is also then not correct. (Break in audio) -- crashed after firing. They have fired at wings and at our aircraft, just not brought them down. . REP. LANTOS: Congressman Smith? REP. CHRIS SMITH (R-NJ): I'd just point out that in The Dallas Morning News, May 14th, '94, it points out that Peru intercepted about 75 planes last year according to the spokesman at the embassy, and they point out that Peruvian jets haven't shot down planes, but they have crashed in trying to evade pursuit. I mean, we may be playing -- they may be playing a game here as the gentleman from New Jersey pointed out. I mean, they crashed while being pursued, perhaps with some bullets or some other coordinates helping them to crash. REP. LANTOS: Go ahead, Mr. Gelbard.. MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. government has frozen assistance and intelligence-sharing with Colombia and Peru, as I said, that could be used for targeting civil aircraft. We have done so because of those governments' announced policies of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey orders to land. I do not need to tell you how important these two countries are to a successful counternarcotics strategy in the Andes. Indeed, with Colombia and Peru, there is no air interdiction strategy in the Andes. We took this decision very seriously. We did not freeze this assistance because of an interagency dispute or because of a decision to downgrade our relations with these two countries or as part of a general retreat on counternarcotics. The Department of Defense and other agencies suspended their assistance in order to review policy implications in light of actions by Colombia and Peru. After that, an interagency legal review led by the Department of Justice concluded that we could not provide this assistance without risk of violating United States criminal law. This is not an easy issue susceptible to a sound bite solution. There is a fundamental conflict between our long-standing policy of maximum protection for civil aircraft in flight and our equally long- standing policy of stopping narcotics traffickers. We searched for a solution that would not undercut either. I spent much of last week in almost nonstop negotiations in Bogota and Lima seeking such a solution. A simple solution under existing law simply was not there. The president, as you are aware, has now made his decision, though, on this policy. The administration will send up as soon as possible proposed legislation that permits us to resume intelligence- sharing and assistance to both Colombia and Peru. I spoke this morning with officials from both governments, Colombia and Peru, and I hope that we can announce soon interim agreements that permit us to resume our counternarcotics cooperation even while our legislative proposal is pending before Congress. Mr. Chairman, I will close as I began, speaking of perceptions. Our critics argue that we are in retreat, that we are not pursuing an aggressive counternarcotics policy. That is not correct. We have a new strategy and a new approach. We have signaled that we will hold all governments to an honest certification process. We are building on past successes. We are confronting head on the tension between our civil aviation and counternarcotics policies.. We appreciate the support of these committees over the years for international counternarcotics efforts. We will need it again as we seek to resolve the conflict between U.S. criminal law and our counternarcotics efforts, and I look forward to continue to working with you. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Secretary Gelbard. We'll next hear from the Honorable Thomas A. Constantine, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. MR. CONSTANTINE: Chairmen Lantos, Torricelli, and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this, my first opportunity to appear before your committees and talk about DEA's role in our international programs. As you may know, I've been administrator of the DEA for a fairly short period of time, a little over three months.. However, prior to taking this position, I've served in law enforcement for 34 years, the last eight of which as superintendent of the New York State Police. So I have spent most of my adult life dealing with victims of crime and have seen first-hand what happens when drug addiction and drug problems visit communities. I also now, in my new role, have gotten an education, learned about the international programs that the United States government is involved in in law enforcement, especially as it relates to drugs. It's given me a new perspective and I think it has helped me a great deal in understanding how that problem came to many of the communities that I was familiar with in New York state. I think it's important, however, that we not lose sight of the fact that the international programs must go hand in hand with what we're doing within the United States, and I'd like to talk today about how our enforcement efforts link the international and the domestic because they are intertwined and cannot be separated. I think, like the ambassador had said, and some of the people on the dais, we are at an important and critical stage in our society. This problem of drugs and violent crime has built since the mid-1960s. It has taken us 30 years to get into the present deplorable state. It will take us a sustained period of time and a great deal of will to get out of it. This is at a time when resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance are very tight. We're required to balance the need to protect citizens from crime in our streets with our international obligations to overseas partners in the drug fight. For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's effort to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations. We will continue to aggressively pursue those traffickers who operate around the globe. As administrator of the DEA, I intend to continue those important global missions, keeping the following principles as guiding our actions in the coming year. First, we must recognize that cocaine and heroin traffic have foreign sources and are foreign controlled, and the world's major trafficking organizations are headquartered outside of the United States. Other nations have international obligation to address the issues of drug production and trafficking. DEA must and will continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build institutions, share intelligence and make criminal cases which will have an impact on drug trafficking within the United States. Simultaneously, we must enhance our domestic efforts as well, balancing both foreign and domestic programs. We should not and cannot put all of our strategies and resources in the international investigative program. That doesn't mean that we will lessen our pressure on the major traffickers in Colombia or other parts of the hemisphere, but rather that we must increase our attention on their surrogates who operate within the United States. The next most important thing I think to be talked about is heroin as a resurrection within the global economy, not only the United States, not only Western Europe, but every country in this world is affected now by a new growth in heroin traffic. A large part of that is coming from Colombia. They have developed the ability to manufacture heroin, to bring it to the shores of the United States and cause us an additional problem. Let me talk a minute about the major traffickers and their surrogates -- one foreign, one domestic.. Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being shipped now to new European markets, the U.S. continues and will continue to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel in Colombia maintains a virtual criminal monopoly on all of the U.S. cocaine supply. This criminal organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on producers in Bolivia and Peru and transporters in Mexico and other Central American nations, and distribution systems within the United States. It also staffs the distribution organizations in virtually every city in the United States with Colombians who subcontract to street organizations in these cities. DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in the United States, targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and trying to eliminate their surrogate operations here in the United States. It is critical to gather enough information on the major cartel leaders for indictments in the event they will ever be brought to justice in the United States. However, I honestly must tell you the opportunity to bring these drug lords to justice is less of a possibility today than it was five years ago, when Colombia allowed extradition to the United States. As a result, all of the traditional law enforcement strategies that I am familiar with, having worked organized crime cases throughout the United States, of attacking the leaders of the criminal enterprises cannot be implemented against the Cali cartel. They live in luxury, virtually immune from punishment as they profit from their enterprise. Nevertheless, we try to operate against their money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications. All of these are critical to their operation. We work closely with most of the law enforcement agencies in the hemisphere to achieve that. Equally important to the DEA are the accomplishments which have a direct effect on United States cocaine supplies in organizations within the United States. This is the link which I talked about, and it's well illustrated by a case that I was involved in when I was superintendent of the New York State Police. The Herrara family, with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a major cell in the major cities throughout the country, one of which was in New York City. The state police, the New York City police and the DEA, focused on the organization through extensive surveillances and wiretapping, were able to identify the principals through a series of raids. We found out very quickly, one, that their whole organization for the year made more money than the entire DEA budget, and that is only one of the families operating out of Cali. All of the decisions that are carried out in the United States are being made in Colombia. They tell the group which phone numbers to use, when the load is ready to move, which loads to move, how much to pay the workers, detail the records on the salaries.. They have a family history questionnaire that means that they know the relatives of all of the people who are working for them, many of them illegal aliens from Colombia, which means that they cannot testify against the principals in the organization, for fear of loss of family or loved ones. There is a tremendous reluctance for them to cooperate. It then moves down to the next level of violent street gangs in the United States. These investigations have to be played from both ends, because we find out that many of the people are replaceable, and until such time as we can use what I think is the appropriate strategy of arresting, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing the principals in these organizations, we're limited to dealing with surrogates, which is second best. But the pressure must be kept up. We've got to remember, it's the violent street gangs, who shoot children in a public housing complex in Washington Heights, are in essence part of that whole operation. If you have any further questions about the role of DEA, I would be glad to put them forward, and I give you my entire statement. The only thing that I can tell you is that I believe that this whole situation, the violent crime and drugs, has become an intolerable situation for people in America, and it's going to take a dramatic resolve on the part of all of us in government and out of government, to do something about it over a sustained period of time. We did not get into this problem overnight, and we will not get out of it immediately, but I do think the next five years will be extremely critical for the United States. Thank you. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. Our final witness is Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense. Mr. Sheridan. MR. SHERIDAN: Chairman Lantos, Torricelli, members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DOD's role on implementing the administration's source nation strategy. There are two quick points I'd like to make before we start with the questioning. First, DOD has a very strong commitment to the strategy and to our responsibilities in South America. The Department of Defense in 1994 will spend approximately $150 million in South America, and that comes in light of dramatic cuts to our budget in '94 of $300 million. There are three pillars to our programs in Latin America: first, intelligence collection and analysis; second, support for interdiction; and third, training of host nation police and military that are engaged in counter-drug activity. My second point is that the Department of Defense's efforts are consistent with the national strategy. As you know, the president's strategy called for a shift from the transit zone to source nations. MORE. In implementing that strategy, DOD is shifting on the international side of our effort from 25 percent of our efforts in source nations to 37 percent of our efforts. So you've heard much in the papers over the last couple weeks that DOD is seeking to walk away from South America. The numbers speak otherwise. Percentage of our dollars is going up, not down. I would also note that under the leadership of the secretary of defense over the past year, we have initiated a number of major programs to enhance our support to South America. We have decided to locate an over-the-horizon radar in Puerto Rico that will cost $25 million to start up plus $13 million a year to operate. We've decided to go (forward with ?) tracker aircraft, at a cost of $45 million, for use in South America. That will cost $18 million a year in the out years to operate. Until the trackers come on line and the over-the- horizon radar comes on line, we are looking to spend about 3 to 4 million dollars a year in cooperation with the Customs Service to help them fund their citation tracker program in South America. And as we plan our funding activity for '96 in the out years, we plan to significantly enhance our support. So DOD is engaged. We are not walking away, and we have a number of major programs which are already in our beginning phases of implementation. And those were the two major points I wanted to make, and I'm ready for your questions. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much. We'll begin the questioning with Chairman Torricelli. REP. ROBERT TORRICELLI (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1991 I went to Peru to see President Fujimori and Colombia with President Gaviria in enormous frustration. The United States at considerable expense had put radars on stations. We were tracking narcotraffickers, and the Peruvian and the Colombian governments refused to intercept. We were doing no more than intellectually satisfying ourselves in seeing the travel routes. As time passed, in part due to pressure from the United States Congress, the Peruvian government changed its policy. The Colombian government even adjusted its policy, and intercept policies began, resulting in the fact that now, 780 flights of narcotraffickers last year were tracked. This led to 31 tons of cocaine being seized, 101 illicit airfields of narcotraffickers being found, and 31 aircraft in Peru being forced to the ground after receiving hostile fire from Peruvian aircraft. This program, just when it was beginning to work, under the insistence of the United States Congress, after the payment from the American taxpayers, is halted. The American people wouldn't believe it if they hadn't seen it for themselves. Now, what is most incredible about this, is the legal analysis is that this is being ceased because of legal vulnerabilities of U.S. government officials from cooperating in the program. Let's understand what the program is. The United States government tracks narco-traffickers bringing cocaine to the United States. That information is merely provided to the Peruvian or Colombian governments. They pass it to their own officials, who make their own judgements. Peruvian aircraft tracks a narco-trafficker, operating with no flight plan, often at night, with no lights. The plane is approached and wing tips attempt to communicate. There's no response. They attempt on radio communications on multiple frequencies. There's no response. There's an effort to lead them to an airport for a forced landing. They refuse and attempt to evade. And then warning shots are fired. Do you seriously believe that there is a jury in America, of any combination of American citizens, anywhere, under those circumstances, that would find a liability for U.S. government officials? Having simply for provided information on that basis? This change of policy stands logic on its head. Fortunately, President Clinton, having read what was now happening, in the Defense Department, and elsewhere in his administration, has reversed the policy. And this Congress, I am certain, as soon as we get language from the executive, will pass in short order legislation that is required, to allow cooperation to continue. But the question remains, in the weeks or months that it takes to correct this change of policy, what will happen. Is it therefore the intention of the Pentagon not in these ensuing weeks, despite overwhelming logic, to continue to share information? Do we assume, in the following weeks, no further information will continue to be shared, despite the fact that we are now told by the Colombian government that cocaine shipments are up 20 percent last month since the sharing of this interdiction information has ceased? MORE HSE FOR. AFF/GELBARD, ET AL PAGE 21 06/22/94 . MR. GELBARD: If I may respond to that, please, I'd like to answer in several parts. First of all, what we intend to do -- and I have already spoken to our ambassadors in Bogota and Lima and spoken to authorities of those two governments -- what we intend to do is try to establish very, very quickly interim agreements with those governments that would permit us to resume the provision of real-time tracking data as quickly as possible, and I would hope even before the end of this week. REP. TORRICELLI: And what would the substance of those agreements include? MR. GELBARD: The substance of the agreements would be that we would have to continue under existing law, as I mentioned in my oral statement, continue to ask that our data not be used for the shooting down of aircraft. The second part of what I wanted to say is that whether we like the law or not, it is the law. This was a law that was passed by the Congress of the United States in 1984, certainly for other purposes. It was for counterterrorism purposes. But because of the way this law was drafted, it was written to cover any civil aircraft under any circumstances. REP. TORRICELLI: And you think it was the intention of the Congress, of the United States government in the writing of this law taking responsibility for the Peruvian and Colombian air forces? MR. GELBARD: The way the law is written -- and I have to admit I am not a lawyer, but I have read the law repeatedly and I have sought the advice, of course, of all the legal authorities of our government. We have been told by the Department of Justice, particularly including the office of legal counsel, which makes the ultimate decisions on these issues, that this law is written in such a way as to cover any activities and the aiding and abetting of destruction of civil aircraft in service at any time. REP. TORRICELLI: Let me tell you something. In all respect to my profession, lawyers concluding that the United States government is criminally liable for shooting down narcotraffickers because we give information to the Peruvian and Colombian government stands logic on its head. There isn't a jury in the world that would find somebody liable under those circumstances. That is an incredible interpretation of the law. Somebody would have a better chance in the ensuing months if their child is a victim of cocaine on an American street suing the United States government because we had the means to track narcotraffickers, they're appearing on a radar screen, and we refuse to give the information to the Colombian or Peruvian government to intercept them. That would be a better suit than attempting to hold the U.S. government official liable because we're allowing the Colombian government to meet their own responsibilities and independent judgment.. Does this really make sense to you? MR. GELBARD: Congressman, it certainly didn't make sense to me when I read it, but it is the law. And I certainly was not prepared to be in a position of violating the United States law, passed by our Congress, especially once I found out we were subject to the death penalty. And the idea of pursuing policies which -- REP. TORRICELLI: Have you gone to the authors of this legislation to try to decipher their legislative intent? MR. GELBARD: The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department did look at this. They have done an extensive legal opinion on this and this was the subject of truly extensive -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, 435 members of this House voted on that legislation. You will not find one statement in the Congressional Record to support legislative intent. You will find no committee hearing, you will find no author of the legislation who would support that interpretation of the law of liability. Not only will you find it, I suspect some lawyer in the Justice Department who wrote this interpretation, who never did so much as open their window to hear the outside noise, never asked anybody whether that was anybody's legislative intent. This has been written in a vacuum, and it is an incredible betrayal of the American people and a fundamental national interest. Let me -- Mr. Chairman, you've been gracious with the time. Let me just move quickly, if I could -- MR. GELBARD: Could I just add one other point, please? REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah, sure. MR. GELBARD: You mentioned 1991 in Peru. Let me add, though, another aspect of this problem. Nineteen ninety-one also marked the year when we ceased providing economic support funds and military assistance funds to the government of Peru, because the Congress decided that we could not disburse such funds because of certain conditions that were provided. So, as of today, we have approximately $77 million in economic support funds that we have not been able to disburse, and as a result not used to support activities to eradicate coca through alternative development programs, nor have we been able to provide the military assistance that we have requested because of these actions. . REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Gelbard, as you know, aid to Peru was suspended for a variety of reasons. One of those reasons, much to my great embarrassment, is that I went in that year and saw President Fujimori and I said, "I will not be part of using American taxpayers' money for counternarcotics operations in your country when you get this radar information and then you won't intercept the narco- traffickers. If you're serious about this and you want American cooperation, shoot at the narco- traffickers." They thought about it for a long time and they didn't want to do it. They finally agreed, now to find out that the United States government disagreed with this Congress and pulls away from the cooperation when they were finally starting to help.. MR. GELBARD: I would still like -- REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Sheridan -- MR. GELBARD: -- very much to be able to have those funds so we could get to the heart of the problem, which is the eradication of coca. And I would ask for the assistance of this committee in freeing up those funds, whether as cash transfers or as project funds, so that we can use this to support their efforts to eradicate coca. Because that's what gets to the heart of the problem. REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, I suspect at the moment that such damage has been done to our cooperation with Colombia and Peru and narco-trafficking, that if the funds are available to you, you're going to have a hard time getting the same degree of cooperation. These Peruvian and Colombian officials were vilified in their own countries for allowing the United States military to fly over their airspace, to do operations, to take information for the United States Air Force, to do shootdown operations against narco- traffickers. This was not good politics for Peru and Colombia, but theyd did it. They did partially at the request of members of this Congress, and now to have it shut off humiliates them and I think is a setback that's going to be very difficult to reverse. Mr. Sheridan, finally, if I could, with all due respects to the intensive interest of the United States military in helping in narco- trafficking interdiction, every six months for the last four years I have had to call successive secretaries of defense and ask that their intentions to close down these radars be reversed. First, it was the Persian Gulf War. The radars are needed in the Middle East. By all means, take them away. Then it took months to get them back. And then six months later, they were needed somewhere else. And then six months later they wanted to close them down again. if indeed the United States military has reached the point that they want to help and they are committed to fight against narco- trafficking, I will tell you there is precious little evidence of it. I know that members of the United States military did not join to fight narco-traffickers. It was for other and very admirable goals. This is a dirty and a nasty business. And I don't blame you for not wanting to be part of it. But a principal national security need of the United States today is no longer the Cold War. It is narcotraffickers. And operating these radars and keeping them there. And people, like members of this having to call and fight to keep them on station and now to share the information is not evidence of a strong commitment in the fight against narco traffickers. MR. SHERIDAN: Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to what happened during the previous administration. I can only say that during this administration I think the record speaks for itself in terms of our allegation of resources. I don't know a more exact measure of commitment than you're willingness to put dollars to it. And as I stated in my opening comments, under this secretary of defense we have committed to a -- (word inaudible) -- in Puerto Rico at a cost of $25 million up front, $13 million a year the outyears, $45 million up front, $18 a year in the outyears for tracker aircraft, helping the customs service in the meantime at a cost of 3 to $4 million per year to fly their tracker aircraft, and we have significantly enhanced our support in our five-year planning process.. I don't know what more you want from this administration. REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Sheridan, here's what I -- here's what I'd like. MR. SHERIDAN: Yes. REP. TORRICELLI: Last fall, President Gaviria of Colombia sent a message to this committee that the radars were about to be removed, would I call Secretary Perry's office. I did. Six months before that, I got a call from President Gaviria the Pentagon was going to remove the radars, would I call Secretary Aspin. I did. A good evidence of the commitment of the military would be to stop trying to find every excuse to get out of Colombia, to close down the radars, to cease cooperation, and instead, to accept this as a national priority. And the refusal to share this information is not a good example of it being of a high national priority. Mr. Gelbard, finally -- I know my time has expired here -- but if indeed we're going to have a gap now of several weeks or months before this Congress can pass legislation which I will introduce the moment it arrives on this Hill to correct this incredible legal misinterpretation, why do we not now simply transfer or lease these radars, allow the Colombians to operate them, to separate ourselves from this alleged liability so there's no interruption in interdiction? As I said, Congressman, I am hoping to be able to work out arrangements on an interim basis with the two governments involved in the next day or two. I just spoke earlier with the Colombian ambassador, and we may be meeting even this afternoon. REP. TORRICELLI: Okay, well, let's leave it this way. MR. GELBARD: But in the mean -- REP. TORRICELLI: If for any reason this cannot happen, can we then agree that if we're going into next week, given the fact that we are seeing a 20 percent upward spike in cocaine trafficking since this interruption has taken place, that we can instead find more imaginative means in the interim -- if we have to go to a lease, if we have to go to a temporary transfer, something to separate us from liability but continue the operations, that we will do so? MR. GELBARD: I think the issue, even more than the ground-based radars, though, is the airborne platforms, which we cannot provide, but I am fully confident we will be able to work out these interim arrangements before the end of the week. REP. TORRICELLI: Could you -- could you comment briefly on the allegations today in the media? It is alleged that during the recent Colombian presidential campaign, representatives of the man who is now to become the next president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, received in excess of $800,000 in campaign contributions from the Cali cocaine cartel.. Could you comment on those allegations and the videotapes that are now circulating giving evidence of that transfer? MR. GELBARD: First, they are audio cassettes, or an audio cassette. REP. TORRICELLI: There are both. MR. GELBARD: Second, I believe that the sums that have been described, from the transcripts I've seen that were released in Colombia, are actually substantially more in terms of funds that were allegedly received. REP. TORRICELLI: Well, one videotape has $800,000 in cash. MR. GELBARD: Yeah, I've heard -- REP. TORRICELLI: I'm told the total number is $3.5 million. MR. GELBARD: Well, I think it's actually more. I think it's about $6 million. Obviously, this is the worst kind of information that we could receive. We are looking into this to try to determine the veracity of any and all of this kind of information. This, if true, would obviously have the most serious effect on not only any kind of bilateral relationship with that government, but obviously would create the most serious problems in terms of fighting counternarcotics. But we take this extremely seriously and we are investigating this very intensively right now. REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins (chugins@cup.hp.com) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268 ============================================================================= Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: chugins@cup.hp.com (Chris Hugins) Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part Two Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:52 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was sgastete@u.washington.edu ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:06:53 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service JUNE 22, 1994, WEDNESDAY Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere Chaired By: Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca) Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj) Witnesses: Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters, Thomas Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building Washington, Dc ... REP. LANTOS: Before turning to Mr. Gilman, I'd like to just explore a couple of issues that have been raised. What happened on May 1 that compelled us to stop sharing information? Why was May 1 different from April 30, April 29 or May 2? What was the magic of that May 1 date? Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: I'm afraid I can't answer that. REP. LANTOS: Well somebody made the decision. Who, in your judgment, made that decision, that on May 1 cooperation ceased? . MR. GELBARD: The decision was made by the Department of Defense. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Sheridan, why was the Department of Defense ready to share information on April 30 and April 29 and April 28, and all the proceeding months, and suddenly stopped sharing information? MR. SHERIDAN: There was a concern at the department, it was voiced in the interagency some time previous to that, that we were having problems, legal problems, with what could be done with our information. I would disagree respectfully with Chairman Torricelli. The assets that we provided down there were never intended by the previous administration or this one to shoot down aircraft. They were intended to provide information that could be used to support ground- based end games, which the chairman I think did describe quite accurately.. They have been successful in leading to ground operations which have destroyed airfields and seized cocaine on the ground. They were never intended to provide information to shoot down aircraft in flight. And when it became apparent that the Colombians and Peruvians wanted to do this, which was inconsistent with long- standing U.S. policy and with agreements that we had with them, we knew that we had a potentially large problem on our hands and we decided that, given the ongoing nature of the discussions we were having and the sense that we couldn't bring this to a close, that we needed to protect DOD personnel and cease providing that while we sort this out. REP. LANTOS: Now, Secretary Gelbard testified a minute ago that he has every expectation that before the end of this week, he will work out temporary arrangements that will achieve the goal of continuing to provide information. Am I quoting you correctly? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Well, if you have the ability, Secretary Gelbard, to make this arrangement within the next 48 hours, what prevented the Department of State from doing this between April 27 and May 1, so we wouldn't have had this absurdity of stopping this abruptly, causing all of the consequences that we have been discussing, and now having to come to us with legislation that presumably is not needed because you will be able to arrange the desired result without legislation? MR. GELBARD: What I said before, Mr. Chairman, is that, given current law, we will be seeking interim agreements with those governments that any U.S.-provided tracking data not be used for shooting at or shooting down aircraft. Both governments have told me that if there is a long-term solution in sight, they are prepared to work out shorter-term interim arrangements along these lines. REP. LANTOS: Well, what prevented the Department of State from doing this two months ago? MR. GELBARD: Because neither government was prepared, given the lack of a change in U.S. policy at that time, to work out such agreements because of their stated policies of shooting down or shooting at aircraft. REP. LANTOS: I don't understand the change in status or attitudes.. MR. GELBARD: When I was in Bogota and Lima during the last two weeks, we -- REP. LANTOS: No, go back to March and April. The Department of Defense is testifying that in interagency meetings, they were threatening to terminate this activity.. Is that accurate? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Is it also accurate that the Department of State was fully aware of that? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: So it didn't come as a surprise to you that on May 1 the Department of Defense stopped its sharing of information? MR. GELBARD: They informed us that they would. REP. LANTOS: How far in advance? MR. GELBARD: I can't recall. REP. LANTOS: Approximately. MR. GELBARD: Several days before. REP. LANTOS: Just several days? Mr. Sheridan, when did DOD advise the other -- who were -- who was it participating in the interagency discussions, in addition to State and Defense? MR. SHERIDAN: Most of these discussions took place -- and we have interagency working group meetings about every two weeks, and there's a whole cast of characters who attend those meetings. REP. LANTOS: At that point, to the best of your recollection, did DOD advise the others that you will cease sharing information on May 1? MR. SHERIDAN: On April 20, the undersecretary of defense sent a letter to the undersecretary of state notifying him of DOD's intention unless we receive those assurances. REP. LANTOS: And what was the response from the Department of State? MR. SHERIDAN: I would yield to Ambassador Gelbard. . REP. LANTOS: What was the response, Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: We did not agree with their decision. We did not send a written answer, but we did not agree with them and we told them that. One thing I would like to stress, though, Mr. Chairman -- REP. LANTOS: Well I still -- I still need an answer to my previous question. You are now telling these committees that within 48 hours you will be able to arrange a satisfactory interim solution. Is that correct? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. REP. LANTOS: Well, if that is the case, then my question still stands: Why, having received a letter from the deputy secretary of defense on April 20th, telling you that they will cease sharing information, why did not Department of State come up with this interim solution? MR. GELBARD: Because those governments were not prepared, as we saw during our visit to those two countries last week, to accept that kind of interim solution or that kind of solution as a long- term solution, unless there was going to be a chance in U.S. policy. They urged us to change our policy, but at the time and until yesterday, when the president made his decision, there was no change in U.S. policy envisioned.. REP. LANTOS: But why was this change of policy coming about in such a leisurely fashion? MR. GELBARD: We have not been taking this in any leisurely fashion. This has been examined very intensively. We have been struggling with this issue which is a very complicated one and we have not been happy about this in the slightest, none of us. But this has been a serious problem and we do take the law of the United States very seriously. REP. LANTOS: Everybody takes the law of the United States very seriously. Apparently on April 30th -- was that law in effect on April 30th? MR. GELBARD: Of course it was. REP. LANTOS: Was it in effect on March 31? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. REP. LANTOS: How 'bout last Christmas? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir, the Congress had passed -- REP. LANTOS: How about a year ago this Easter? MR. GELBARD: Yes sir the Congress had passed this -- REP. LANTOS: (Interrupts) -- So all of this time this law was in effect. MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. The Congress had passed this law in 1984. REP. LANTOS: So for ten years between 1984 and May 1, 1994, the law was in effect and it didn't make much difference. But suddenly on May 1, it became an item on which this action had to be taken by DOD. MR. GELBARD: Let me explain two separate sets of legal issues. In July of 1990, during the last administration, the U.S. government did convey to the government of Colombia our concerns based on international law that we were opposed to their using the data we were providing them at that time for shooting down aircraft. This is based on the Chicago convention and the Montreal conventions. And we told them at the time -- as I said, July of 1990 -- that if such information provided by the United States or assistance provided by the United States were used for shooting down aircraft, that would have serious affect on our ability to continue to provide such assistance. The Colombian government only changed its policy to have a stated policy of shooting at or shooting down aircraft earlier this year and it was based on that change in policy that there was a new examination of the implications of that policy on international law. In the course of this examination, the Justice Department and the general counsels of the other departments of the executive branch discovered these various domestic laws and after intensive examination this spring, they came back to us very firmly and very clearly and told us that we were not allowed to provide such assistance. REP. LANTOS: Colombia changed its policy only early this year. MR. GELBARD: Yes sir. REP. LANTOS: When did Peru change its policy? MR. GELBARD: I believe a year ago. REP. LANTOS: Well, why wasn't there an immediate change then? MR. GELBARD: I can't answer that, sir. REP. LANTOS: Congressman Gilman. REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your are certainly raising some important issues.. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you're certainly raising some important issues. Mr. Sheridan, it's my understanding that Section 1004 of the code of 21 USC 1503 establishing the office of drug control policy states that, and I quote: "The head of the national drug control program agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any proposed change in policies relating to the activities of such department or agency under the national drug control program prior to the implementation of such a change." Was the director notified of your change? I'm talking now about the director of the national drug control program, the Drug Czar, as we refer to him. Had he been notified prior to the change? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, in the interagency meetings which we discussed there was representation from ONDCP at that meetings. REP. GILMAN: Says that the "Agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any proposed change in policies." Had the director been notified, in writing, of any proposed change by the Pentagon? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, the -- REP. GILMAN: Can you tell us whether he was notified? I think that only takes a yes or no answer. MR. SHERIDAN: Well sir, it depends on what you're calling a change in policy. There's been a long-standing U.S. policy that we do not fire at civil aircraft in flight, and do not support that activity. REP. GILMAN: Then you contend, Mr. Sheridan, that by the Pentagon directing a cessation of the sharing of intelligence was not a change of policy? Is that what you're telling this committee? Is that your impression, that this was not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: It was not a change in policy regarding U.S. policy toward the treatment of civil aircraft in flight. REP. GILMAN: The cutting off of intelligence to Colombia and Peru was not a change in our government's policy toward Colombia and Peru? That's an astounding response as far as I'm concerned. What would you call it if it's not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: Well, let me just remind that it was never the Department of Defense's intention to cease providing information. But we had wanted and had hoped and continue to hope is that those nations would not use out information to shoot down civil aircraft in flight. REP. GILMAN: Is that put down in writing someplace? That's the first I've heard that condition. MR. SHERIDAN: Which condition is that? REP. MYERS: The one you just recited, that it was your hope that you continue to give them information but that they wouldn't use it for some purpose. MR. SHERIDAN: Well, that was certainly understood to be DOD's position. REP. GILMAN: Understood by who? MR. SHERIDAN: It was understood by all the elements of our government that that's what we wanted. REP. GILMAN: Mr. Sheridan, again I'm asking you, why wasn't there a compliance with this section of the code, that any change in policy would be provided to the director in writing? So that the director would have an opportunity, as this statue goes out to promptly review such proposed change and certify to the department or agency head in writing whether such change is consistent with our national drug control strategy? I don't think I'm asking for a complicated response. MR. SHERIDAN: Well, I'm not sure what you're asking me for. Was there a letter sent? No, there was not. REP. GILMAN: There was nothing in writing then provided to the director? MR. SHERIDAN: No. That's right. REP. GILMAN: So then you're in violation of the statute. Is that right? MR. SHERIDAN: We did not interpret the statute that way or our activity that way. REP. GILMAN: Had you ever notified the director of your change in sharing of intelligence in writing? MR. SHERIDAN: In writing, no. REP. GILMAN: Isn't there a task force that meets regularly on narcotics? Do you meet with that task force? MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, those are the working group meetings that we discussed earlier. REP. GILMAN: How often do you meet with the working group? MR. SHERIDAN: Once every two weeks or as called. REP. GILMAN: And was the drug czar present at the working group immediately after you changed your policy or, as you say, you made a -- I don't know what you want to call it if it's not a change of policy -- when you differed from what you were doing in the past? Was he present at a meeting following that May 1st decision? MR. SHERIDAN: There were many meetings that followed that. REP. GILMAN: Did you discuss that with the director? MR. SHERIDAN: This was thoroughly discussed. REP. GILMAN: And was it discussed with Mr. Gelbard's office? . MR. SHERIDAN: We've been involved in nonstop discussions on this issue every day since I don't know. REP. GILMAN: Was it discussed with the DEA? MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, DEA -- REP. GILMAN: Was there any difference in opinion amongst -- within the task force with regard to this shifting of policy if it's not a change in policy? MR. SHERIDAN: You can discuss that with other members of the interagency. REP. GILMAN: I'm sorry. I didn't understand the response. MR. SHERIDAN: Other members of the interagency process, I think, could speak for themselves. I will not speak for them. REP. GILMAN: Well, was there any difference of opinion as far as you recall after you had made that pronouncement of a shifting of the policy? MR. SHERIDAN: There were a number of different -- I mean -- positions held by different agencies, but I would prefer to let them speak for themselves. REP. GILMAN: Well, what is your recollection? Was there a difference of opinion expressed by those other agencies? MR. SHERIDAN: Regarding the interpretation of international law? REP. GILMAN: No, regarding your shifting -- the Pentagon shifting of the policy on exchange of intelligence. I don't think I'm making a very complicated question out of this. MR. SHERIDAN: There were some agencies, I suppose, that agreed and some that disagreed. REP. GILMAN: Mr. Gelbard, were you present at any of these meetings? MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir. I'm the chairman of the group. REP. GILMAN: And was there any difference of opinion with regard to those members of the task force, the working group. MR. GELBARD: There were differences of opinion, sir. REP. GILMAN: And did anyone raise the question of shouldn't the director be given a notice in writing to give him an opportunity to respond in writing? MR. GELBARD: Members of his staff are in attendance at all those meetings and the issue of informing him in writing, however, did not come up. REP. GILMAN: Had the Congress ever been notified about that time of the change in policy? MR. GELBARD: Not that I'm aware of. REP. GILMAN: When was the Congress first notified? MR. GELBARD: I can't recall, sir. REP. GILMAN: As I recall I guess it was a newspaper notification is the first we received. I haven't seen any formal notification from the task force, from the director or from your office with regard to a -- my colleagues seem to confirm that it was a newspaper when we first learned of the shifting of the policy. It seems to me that the task force ought to take a look at the statute and get back to where the Congress intended them to be with regard to the narcotics control strategy and any change in the strategy. Now according to most recent -- (word inaudible) -- reports, there's been a 30 percent decline in coco cultivation in Peru since the last report. I understand that the upper Huallaga production has gone down considerably because of a fungus. Maybe we ought to make use of that fungus elsewhere. However, the combination factors would seem to provide an ideal opportunity for our nation and Peru to explore some new initiatives since that irradication that's been completed by the fungus makes them now explore new seed beds and apparantly we see a disarray in the U.S. policy that's undermining our ability to cooperate with the Peruvians and yet we have an opportunity now to get into these new areas where it's going to take three to five years to provide new growth. And with production down, with the growers more susceptible to counter measures, I think we're missing some great opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities in the cultivation production cycle that we've seen since cultivation first exploded in the Andean region. I was one of the first promoters of putting some money in the upper Huallaga valley -- $50 million initial appropriation and try to irradicate and they still haven't spent some of that money because the terrorists and the drug traffickers control that whole valley. I'm wondering what we're doing to take advantage of this situation where the cultivation has been reduced substantially; they're going to have to go into new beds of productions. What are we doing to try to take advantage of that to see what we can do about irradicating that entire crop in that region? MR. GELBARD: First, we have extended all the available funds we have to support irradication and alternative crop programs. That is precisely why I made my plea a bit earlier to free up the $77 million in economic support funds for Peru which has still been frozen.. We could use those funds right now, Congressman Gilman, precisely for the purposes that you have cited. I agree with you 100 percent. We are missing an opportunity if we're not able to begin those kinds of projects to take advantage of the effect of the significant decrease in coca production in the upper Huallaga and other parts of Peru. Second, since we have had so little in the way of economic support funds to help use to support eradication and alternative development programs, but because it also makes sense, we are also trying to get the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank engaged for the first time in alternative development projects to help lure farmers away from growing coca and into other kinds of pursuits. We're pursuing that aggressively and we think we are making some good headway on that. REP. GILMAN: Well I'm pleased to hear that you're taking a look at that. Tell me now, we have a $37 million cut made in the House side in the State Department's INM program in the budget for '95. That I would imagine would have a significant impact on your work, and yet we didn't hear anything from the administration about its efforts to do battle with that cut or to come forward and advocate greater funding. Have you made some efforts now to try to correct that loss in the INM budget? MR. GELBARD: Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, first the decrease in fiscal year '94 from $152 million to $100 million has hurt us enormously. Second, while the efforts by helpful members of the House of Representatives, such as you, have helped bring up the level to $115 million in the House, and we continue to try to press for the full $152 million as we did in the House and also are now trying in the Senate, if we do not get full funding, given the more globalized nature of this problem, particularly because of the increasing spread of heroin trafficking, opium poppy cultivation and the geographic increase throughout Asia and into the former Soviet Union, we are going to have to cut back and close programs in a number of areas. This has just had a chilling effect on us. REP. GILMAN: I think, Mr. Gelbard -- and I appreciate your comments about that, and we certainly want to help, I think it would be extremely helpful if the administration would put its shoulder behind the wheel of what you're trying to do and raise that funding. We have too seldom heard from this administration with regard to the need for better funding in the drug programs. The words out there are great and the speeches are great, but the deeds lack any support for those words.. MORE. And I hope that you would encourage the administration to show up on the Hill and let us know that they're fully behind what you're seeking to do. I'd be pleased to yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. LANTOS: (Off mike.) REP. WYNN (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sheridan, just generally speaking, from an operational standpoint, how do you assess the success or failure of DOD's operations in this interdiction effort? I mean, there's obviously a substantial loss in confidence in our ability to execute this type of program. What's your overall assessment? MR. SHERIDAN: Of DOD's performance in South America? REP. WYNN (?): Yes. MR. SHERIDAN: I would say that over the last number of years, principally supporting the State Department's (INMF ?) efforts and working with DEA, we have been developing the capability to disrupt the movement of cocaine, and I think the results are improving every year. I think my numbers indicate there were somewhere around 130 metric tons seized in Latin America last year, and that is significantly more than you would have found, certainly 10 years ago -- REP. WYNN (?): Okay. You're not focusing significantly on disruption of production, is that a safe conclusion? MR. SHERIDAN: On production? Our efforts are designed to -- DOD's specifically are designed to interdict the flow of either finished cocaine or semi-finished cocaine. REP. WYNN (?): Mr. Gelbard, my colleague jokingly suggested perhaps we ought to use that fungus in a more systematic manner. I think to some extent he has a point in that that's the only thing that seems to have slowed production. Is there any consideration of utilizing a biological technology in this way? MR. GELBARD: Don't think it hasn't occurred to us, Congressman. And I say this with great hesitation in front of Congressman Torricelli, but once again, we have laws, through the Biological Warfare Convention and U.S. statutes, which prevent us from using what would be biological agents. We are trying -- REP. WYNN (?): Have there been any attempts to maybe focus that question? As opposed to biological warfare, to drug interdiction, has there been any attempt to create that kind of focus? MR. GELBARD: We are really pressing the governments of Bolivia and Peru on eradication attempts, because as I said earlier, this is what really gets to the heart of the problem. REP. WYNN (?): It seems to be working in Guatemala. What's the problem? You have a good record, apparently, of elimination and eradication of poppy production -- cultivation, rather, in Guatemala. Why hasn't that been duplicated? MR. GELBARD: First, in Guatemala, the area that was involved was really pretty small, although indeed you're right, the eradication efforts have been very, very effective there. Colombia, too, has been working at eradicating opium poppies and they've eradicated approximately 22,000 hectares, about 55,000 hectares -- REP. WYNN (?): Apparently that's not very significant. I know we have a vote (on question ?). In Colombia, apparently there have been allegations that some of the military units are engaged in human rights violations. Can you comment on that? And if so, what efforts are being made to prevent this from happening, screening out these units or what have you? MR. GELBARD: We have been working to assure that there is strong end use monitoring measures for any military equipment that we provide. REP. WYNN (?): First of all, do you have the information on the violations? Do they exist or not? MR. GELBARD: We do have reports about human rights violations, and we have been pressing the government of Colombia about this over time. We have had lots of conversations with human rights organizations in the United States and internationally, and we feel that the Colombian government has been trying to improve its systems to prevent human rights violations because they feel strongly about it. REP. WYNN (?): In view of the time, could you send me something a little more comprehensive on this subject in terms of exactly what we're doing, exactly the extent of the alleged violations, how broad- based they are, and whether they have any official sanction? MR. GELBARD: Yes, Congressman, I will. REP. WYNN (?): Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.,. REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you. Mr. Lantos is going to return in a moment. However, since I may not get the chance again, let me finally just say for myself on two issues. First, the Bush administration certainly could be criticized for emphasizing the war against drugs only in the growing fields of Latin America and in interdiction while ignoring the consumption problem of the United States. This administration must be very careful in its considerable and commendable enthusiasm for dealing with the narcotics problem within the United States in terms of consumption that our efforts at interdiction are not compromised. Part of the reason why there has been so much concern with this failure to continue cooperation with Peru and Colombia, that it is final evidence that our previous efforts at interdiction no longer have considerable support. That may or may not be the case, but it is the impression, and it clearly is causing political doubts in Colombia and Peru and is being interpreted by the narcotraffickers as open season, leading to precipitous increases in shipments. It would appear to me that the concern of this committee, the attention of the media and, I suspect, the considerable attention of the president of the United States has led to, if not a reversal, a correction in policy that will solve this problem. If that is the case, I'm pleased with the hearing, it is mission accomplished, we can get on with our business. But it is a word to the wise that there may be an imbalance in policy. Finally, let me say I was in Nicaragua last week and visited the Atlantic Coast, the Mosquito Coast.. The next policy issue this administration must address is because of our historic differences with the Sandinista military of Nicaragua there is no communication and no cooperation. The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is open season for narco-traffickers. There is not one patrol boat operating by the Nicaraguan government on the Atlantic coast. There is no interdiction. Narco-traffickers daily are stopping their craft along that coast for supplies and for (rations ?) without interruption. We have to get over the difficulties of the last decade and begin cooperating with the Nicaraguan military, because they share some of our interests in gaining sovereignty back over their coast. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Chairman Torricelli. Let me pursue the proposed legislation that I take it will be sent up here soon. When do you expect that legislative draft to reach the Hill, Secretary Gelbard? MR. GELBARD: I'm hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that it will be in the next day or so. REP. LANTOS: Now, let us assume that we introduce it immediately and Chairman Torricelli and I will introduce it, assuming that it meets our approval immediately -- let's assume that Congress acts expeditiously and the legislation passes. What in essence will that legislation call for? MR. GELBARD: We're asking for a narrow change in existing U.S. Criminal Code provisions on the use of force against civilian aircraft. There would be an exemption from criminal liability use of force by specifically designated foreign governments facing national security threats from drug trafficking so long as those countries have in place appropriate procedures to protect innocent aircraft. We would also exempt assistance by the United States government to those countries. And we are doing this obviously in the context of the very difficult conditions that we see the governments of Colombia and Peru in right now.. REP. LANTOS: Is this legislation, proposed legislation, in any sense in conflict with procedures and policies of international organizations? MR. GELBARD: At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we want to begin to looking at changes in international conventions because there is a feeling that they might very well -- in fact, they are in conflict with some existing international conventions. I have already discussed with the governments of Colombia and Peru the issue of developing a multilateral approach to make a similar kind of narrow exception in the international -- relevant international conventions through the International Civil Aviation Organization. REP. LANTOS: Well, let's assume that International Civil Aviation Organization does not change its policies. Are we under those circumstances prepared to go it -- go this way on a unilateral basis? MR. GELBARD: My understanding is that once we are able to affect the necessary legislative changes in U.S. law, that we are prepared to do so. REP. LANTOS: Is this your understanding also, Mr. Sheridan? MR. SHERIDAN: The Department of Defense will do what it's told, if that is the intention of the president. I mean, you're talking about a hypothetical situation, and we're not there yet. But certainly the department is committed to the counterdrug effort and will support the president's desire. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, what is your view of this proposed legislation? MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I've been kind of sitting here kind of happy I wasn't either of these two for about the last hour. -- (Laughter.) . REP. LANTOS: We decided that since this is your first appearance, we would give you somewhat of a free ride. -- (Laughter.) . MR. CONSTANTINE: One of the things that I think is important to say, Congressman, is that -- to put all this stuff in perspective -- is that this is just one part of a strategy on the part of law enforcement or government to do something about the drug problem. The providing of information if it can be done legally to other countries and that they take action as necessary, that is some bit of deterrence as to narcotics traffickers flying from Bolivia or Peru into Colombia, and it's somewhat like -- it becomes exacerbated when you say, "Well, we can't do anything about it." It becomes public. It's like saying you'll never chase a drunken driver down a road again, every drunken driver will decide to flee. But there's a lot of other issues from the position of DEA that I mentioned here today that we think are equally if not more important. The eradication seems to have seized tonnage and tonnage of cocaine, and surely if it wasn't seized, it would be here and cause us even more problems, perhaps at a lower price. But the price hasn't gone up, and the amount keeps increasing or keeps becoming available. We look at DEA as to the seizure of narcotics if possible should be related to the making of a criminal case against all of the principles who are involved in the process, and I think that's where the seizure become important. And that's where the intelligence information becomes vital to you to put it together. My concern is -- other than this issue, which everybody has addressed today, and I appreciate everybody's concern, it was an education to me -- is that the principles involved in this narcotic traffic presently are immune from sanction. As long as they remain immune from sanction, a lot of other strategies that we have are really less effective. REP. LANTOS: I full agree with you, and let me ask Secretary Gelbard, why do they remain immune from sanctions? MR. GELBARD: I'm sorry, could you -- REP. LANTOS: Why are the principles immune from sanctions? MR. GELBARD: You mean the drug traffickers? We are attempting and we have had major efforts in a variety of ways to emphasize extradition, to emphasize evidence sharing when there are either not indictments in the United States or a prohibition on extradition of nationals, we've made major efforts to try to help governments develop -- REP. LANTOS: But what leverage do we have? What leverage do we have? MR. GELBARD: We have the ability -- REP. LANTOS: Be specific, country by country. MR. GELBARD: I -- we have the ability on an overall basis, because of the certification process, to impose sanctions when we feel those governments are not cooperating fully with us. We have -- REP. LANTOS: We are -- leaving the kingpins immune certainly would indicate that they are not cooperating with us. MR. GELBARD: What we have been doing is trying to help those governments develop cases -- REP. LANTOS: No, no, let me take you back to Director Constantine's point. His main complaint -- and I suspect the American people would overwhelming agree with him -- that we are impotent as long as the kingpins living in these countries are immune. Now do you agree with his basic point that they are immune? MR. GELBARD: No, I don't. We have -- the governments of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia specifically have put a number of these people in jail, there have been other instances where major traffickers have been killed, fleeing or in other law enforcement efforts. REP. LANTOS: Now what is the current status of the Colombian government's efforts to negotiate a settlement with the leaders of the Cali cartel under the surrender decree? MR. GELBARD: We have had a major problem with their prosecutor- general, Gustavo Degrave (ph), who is independent from the government, and who, as we have said publicly, as we have said privately, as we have been fighting, has been trying to avoid serious prosecution and asset seizure of major traffickers -- from major traffickers in the Cali cartel. As a result, we have suspended any -- REP. LANTOS: So when you say independent, you mean independent for what period of time, and how can that independence be curtailed? MR. GELBARD: He has an independent term. REP. LANTOS: When does that term end? MR. GELBARD: I believe he has several more years, theoretically, in office. REP. LANTOS: And under no circumstances can he be removed -- MR. GELBARD: He can be -- REP. LANTOS: -- prior to the termination of his tenure? MR. GELBARD: As I understand it, he can be removed by the Colombian constitutional or supreme court. REP. LANTOS: And has that been attempted? MR. GELBARD: That has not yet been attempted, but has been under discussion within Colombia. We have made very clear, both publicly and privately, our refusal to work with him because of his misuse of U.S.-provided assistance, his lack of seriousness about prosecution of major drug traffickers. REP. LANTOS: Well, and what -- what's the next step. MR. GELBARD: And we hope that -- and we have tried to encourage the government of Colombia, particularly there, to urge that he be removed from his position, and we have stressed this through our unwillingness to work with him.. We feel that President Gaviria and his government, who have very strong records of fighting against drug trafficking, are also very dissatisfied with his performance, and they've made that very clear. President Gaviria has come out very strongly against him publicly. REP. LANTOS: How about the degree of cooperation we are getting from Peru? MR. GELBARD: It's a very different situation because of the fact that the major traffickers are mostly concentrated in Colombia. But back in January, for example, the Colombian police arrested the leading Peruvian trafficker, they quickly deported him to Peru, he received a life sentence, which he's currently serving, and they are also trying to go after other major traffickers. However, as in many of these countries, there have been serious problems in terms of both prosecution and problems with correction. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, having been in the job only three months and having a very distinguished record in the field of law enforcement, on the basis of this very limited time frame, what changes would you recommend in our international drug policy? MR. CONSTANTINE: I would think that the key issue right now and will be for the next several years is the Cali cartel because, as the Ambassador Gelbard has said, the Colombian police at great personal cost were very effective in dealing with the group out of Medellin. REP. LANTOS: Yes. MR. CONSTANTINE: I think it was a good example for us to see how, with the right pressure and government moving strongly against it, how something like that can disintegrate fairly quickly. I honestly have to tell you, even though I'm new to this job, I've been involved in investigations with the Cali cartel since 1985 in New York state, substantial investigations in which major principals were indicted for criminal violations of substantial crimes in New York state as long ago as 1989 and have never been brought to justice. And I am concerned that there are that group of people which account for at least 80 percent of all the cocaine traffic in the United States and is suspected of many vicious crimes, under the present constitution of Colombia, obviously, will not be extradited to the United States. The next question is, will they be brought to justice with the appropriate sanctions in Colombia? In my three months of reading every historic report I can, I do not see that happening, and the analogy that I have made with people, having worked organized crime cases, it's a little like letting John Gotti sit in Howard Beach, Queens, and go to the Ravenite (sp) Social Club and do what he wants to do every day, and sending all of the bookmakers and loan-sharkers to jail, while the major principal exists immune. And one of the things that's been effective in organized crime in this country -- I give great credit to Bobby Kennedy, who started all this thing -- was going after the principals, using witnesses against them, giving people breaks, all the way up the line until you get the major figures and send them to prison.. That, to me, would be the greatest asset that you could add to all the present tools that you have to deal with the international narcotics cartels that operate in the United States because it's not that they just sit over there, they direct every minute piece of the operation that's going on in Queens or Los Angeles or Houston. REP. LANTOS: Mr. Gelbard, you are the government's top foreign policy expert in this field; you have this as your responsibility. What in your judgment makes the Cali cartel so much more resilient compared to the Medellin cartel? MR. GELBARD: I think it's been much more difficult to try to develop strong cases but at the same time, we have seen enormous difficulties on the part of individuals in terms of developing the political will to go after them. We have serious difficulty, as I have mentioned before, because of Gustavo Degrave's (pp) unwillingness to seriously approach the problem of the leadership of the Cali cartel in a way of trying to prosecute them -- serious cases. We have been working with the Gaviria government, as Mr. Constantine says, with very good success against the Medellin cartel. These people are indeed slicker. They have operated in a very different way and they have tried to create the image of kinder, gentler drug traffickers. In point of fact, there's still tremendous violence, many murders and this is not a gentle group of people. But we need strong political will on the part of the law enforcement authorities in Colombia to continue to go after them. We've seen it in the Colombian police in the past, we certainly have seen it in the Gaviria administration. We want to work with them and maintain that kind of international cooperation but it's awfully difficult when the individual charged with the prosecutions of these people either won't do it or provides them with nothing more than slaps on the wrist and no asset siezure. REP. LANTOS: Is it your judgment that the government is doing everything it can to get rid of him? MR. GELBARD: I feel quite confident that President Gaviria's government has tried to be very effective on this and they are very frustrated, extremely frustrated. REP. LANTOS: That's not a good enough answer for me. What do you mean by frustrated? MR. GELBARD: Under their system, they do not have the ability to remove him. As I said earlier, he has to be removed by the courts. MORE. REP. LANTOS: And the courts are intimidated. MR. GELBARD: For whatever reasons -- REP. LANTOS: Well, what's your judgment? I mean, this is not an unusual question. I mean, if the courts have the legal right to remove the obstacle in the way of getting at the kingpins of the drug world, then why don't the courts do it? MR. GELBARD: I really don't -- REP. LANTOS: They're either paid off or they're intimidated. So, which of the two is the answer? MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I really don't know the answer to that, but I am still hopeful that DeGrave (sp) will be removed from his position. REP. LANTOS: Well, what is your hunch? Are they intimidated or are they paid off? MR. GELBARD: I'd rather not answer that in open session. REP. LANTOS: Well, we will have a closed session on this whole subject because the answers, frankly, are simply unacceptable to the American people; that this nightmare of the drug epidemic continues because an individual in Colombia is unwilling to prosecute the kingpins of this giant international conspiracy. Mr. Manzullo? REP. MANZULLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Constantine -- Constantine, forgive me -- do you have enough DEA agents? MR. CONSTANTINE: You mean overall? REP. MANZULLO: That's correct. MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I mean, that's a very tough question. I've run police departments now for almost nine or ten years, and there was never enough troopers, there's never enough agents, there's never enough people from the FBI. I think that the difficulty started three years ago when there was gradually, I think in 1991, there was a freezing of budgets, then successively it started to become more difficult -- REP. MANZULLO: Can I race you three years ahead to now, because the administration is cutting the DEA budget by $2 million. That obviously will have some impact on the hiring of DEA agents. It's a very simple question. I mean, at this point -- and I know you've been on the job a very short period of time -- do you feel you have enough DEA agents to carry out your program of interdiction? MR. CONSTANTINE: I'd have to say at this stage of the game that if we could maintain ourselves at full strength, that we'd be able to meet most of the missions. But I also have to tell you -- and I'm going to be very honest with you -- as the heroin targets start to explode underneath us everywhere, that means that you have to look down the road and say, gee, all that I have to do right now, with all of the assets -- and they are not infinite, I mean they are finite resources, and the problems are becoming infinite, so you try to -- REP. MANZULLO: You're short of agents. MR. CONSTANTINE: At this point in time we're about 130 over what has become a reduced target. I've heard on the markup on the bills in both houses that that may very well be corrected.. REP. MANZULLO: So what's your answer? MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I -- REP. MANZULLO: Are you short of agents to adequately -- MR. CONSTANTINE: I can't give you the exact number of agents -- REP. MANZULLO: But you're short, is that correct? MR. CONSTANTINE: Presently we're 130 or 140 over the target. It's less than existed in 1991. But there's a reduced appropriation for the target figure -- REP. MANZULLO: No, I -- I want to lay aside all appropriations and all the congressional legalese and all this -- all this stuff -- and ask you, as a professional police officer, and you've been in this a long, long time and understand the issue, do you feel as of this date that you have enough DEA agents to adequately do the job? MR. CONSTANTINE: No. REP. MANZULLO: Okay. And this is at the same time that the administration is seeking $2 million less than your old DEA budget -- overall DEA budget? MR. CONSTANTINE: I'm not sure that's the figure, though, Congressman. I mean, I would have to check that. REP. MANZULLO: Has the president -- is the president seeking more funding so you can have more DEA agents? MR. CONSTANTINE: I think the budget was hold harmless this year. There was 10 less DEA agents in the budget. REP. MANZULLO: How many do you need, Mr. Constantine? MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, I mean, I would -- REP. MANZULLO: Do you have any idea? MR. CONSTANTINE: It would be an unreasonable figure if I gave it to you right now, because --. REP. MANZULLO: Be unreasonable, because we -- MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, wow. REP. MANZULLO: -- you know -- MR. CONSTANTINE: People accuse me of that often, but I kind of -- REP. MANZULLO: That's not the case, because we're obviously here because we feel there have been cutbacks in -- MR. CONSTANTINE: You presently have 3,500 sworn personnel for DEA covering all of the domestic United States and 53 foreign offices. You know, you could rise up to a number of 7,000 or 8,000. But I think there comes a point in time where all of us say, look, this is the amount of money that we can afford to put into something. I've dealt with these types of issues back in New York State before I came here. Because there's other people, there's people who need rehabilitation, there's prevention programs, there's a balance to all of these things. As I said, I'm pretty sure correctly, in the beginning, if held harmless at the figures for 1991, I think DEA could be very effective in the role that we have to play. REP. MANZULLO: But the reason I'm asking these questions is that the President's overall request for drug control through various programs is $13.2 billion. That's 1.1 billion more than the 12.1 billion enacted for fiscal year 1994. The administration is seeking increased funds in five areas -- drug prevention, up $448 million; drug treatment, up $360 million; drug-related criminal justice spending, up $227 million; international programs, up $76 million; drug-related research -- whatever that is -- up $27 million. And the White House requested reductions in two areas: interdiction, down $94 million; anti-drug intelligence programs, down $600,000. I think that's the reason why we're having this hearing today, because people in the United States Congress and the people in America believe that there is an insincere effort on the part of the Clinton administration to adequately stop the flow of drugs into this country. REP. LANTOS: If my friend will yield to me, I think this is an appalling and totally inaccurate, unfair statement.. To accuse the administration, any American administration, of having an insincere effort to fighting the war against drugs is simply not worthy of a member of this body. REP. MANZULLO: Well, I -- REP. LANTOS: And I truly believe my good friend does not -- cannot mean what he has just said. Partisanship has a role in political debate, but to accuse either this administration or the previous administration of a lack of sincerity in fighting the drug war is not one of them. REP. MANZULLO: Well, I will stand by my ground on that, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your interjection of your thought in here, but when it comes -- apparently when it comes to interdiction, there is no emphasis by this administration. And that's borne out by the fact of the request made by the administration itself. I can only state to you that's how we feel. There are many members of Congress that feel there's been a lack of emphasis on interdiction, and that's why my question to you was sincere, because you're in a position where you know how short you are. And there are many members that feel that the DEA needs more help and want to take and channel resources from other areas into interdiction. So I would stand by my ground that there's a lack of sincerity in trying to interdict the drugs, as borne out by this whole issue with the AWACS. Thank you. MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, if I might -- REP. LANTOS: Please. MR. GELBARD: -- respond to that briefly. As I said in my opening statement, Congressman, the president's strategy concentrates on maintaining very strong interdiction capabilities and very strong law enforcement capabilities. What we have been doing because of the serious budgetary problems with which the administration is faced have been trying to look for the most efficient ways of pursuing these interdiction and law enforcement efforts. And as a result, the president's Western Hemisphere strategy calls for a gradual shift away from the so-called transit zone interdiction area to really trying to concentrate more on the source countries and stopping it at the source. That's a much more effective way than trying to catch it just before it enters our borders. We still feel that is important, too, but we are trying to shift the funds more in the direction of the source countries, where we feel we can stop it with much greater efficiency and cost effectiveness. MR. CONSTANTINE: I would also add, if I could, sir, that the administration's request this year is 9 percent over the '94 actual. And so, as far as we are concerned, the ball is in your court, and we will see what the Congress does with the president's request. But given the budgetary environment that we are in, a 9 percent increase over '94 I think is a substantial commitment on the part of the administration. I would also note that 59 percent of our spending is still on supply reduction. So this notion that, you know, while there is an increased emphasis on drug treatment and so on, that this administration is not committed to supply reduction is imply not so. Sixty cents of every dollar spent is still on the supply reduction side. As Ambassador Gelbard indicated, what we're doing is just -- on the international side -- making some adjustments.. I would also note that international spending is up 22 percent in this Clinton administration's '95 budget request. So if we want to start looking at the numbers, let's look at all of them, and I think we do pretty well. REP. LANTOS: Congressman Mica? REP. MICA: Well I -- you know, I just have tremendous problems with this the -- you know, we're talking about interdiction, they're cutting off intelligence to Peru and Colombia. I mean, that's what really precipitated everything going on here. And when Mr. Gilman was trying to ask a question -- you know, it's apparent to us that when the drug czar, for example, his funding was cut, I believe, by 73 percent, with a massive layoff in his office -- that there are members of Congress that are deeply concerned because we're hearing from the folks back home, and I don't want to use that same word again. But I would expect you gentlemen to get in there and try to scrap more for what little federal dollars are left on discretionary spending in areas of cutting off drugs. I mean -- MR. GELBARD (?): Congressman, we've been trying to do this, and we have been spending a great deal of our time trying to press for the request that went to the Congress in the fiscal year '95 budget. As I said earlier, my budget was reduced by a third in fiscal year '94. We requested $150 million, we received $100 million. I'm afraid the same thing is happening for fiscal year '95. The amounts of money we have available to support eradication programs and development to lure the farmers away from growing coca has diminished enormously. We simply have no funds right now, as I responded to Congressman Gilman, to help the Peruvian government in its efforts to eradicate coca. Now we're encouraging them to look elsewhere, particularly through the development banks, and we're creating an opening there. But we've got serious problems with simply a lack of availability of cash from what we've requested. REP. LANTOS: We'll be in recess for 10 minutes and then resume with Mr. Mica. (Sounds gavel.) . END OF COVERAGE -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins (chugins@cup.hp.com) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268 ============================================================================= Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: chugins@cup.hp.com (Chris Hugins) Subject: Defense Department's Counterdrug Support Programs Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:07 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was sgastete@u.washington.edu ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:00:35 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Brian Sheridan Deputy Asistant Secretary Of Defense Department Of Defense House Foreign Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere Statement Of Brian E. Sheridan Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Drug Enforcement Policy And Support At A Hearing Before The Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights And The Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere Affairs House Committee On Foreign Affairs June 22, 1994 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the Defense Department's counterdrug support programs with you today. During the last year DOD has significantly restructured its counterdrug policy in order to maximize its support of the President's National Drug Control Strategy within existing fiscal guidance. I would like to give you an overview of the new DOD counterdrug policy and programs, among which are activities that support source nation counterdrug efforts in the Andean region. First, I would like to touch on some of the realities that have been brought home very clearly to me in the year that I have been the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. Foremost among these is the enormity of the drug problem facing our Nation. Although the scourge of drug use has been displaced in the headlines in recent years, it is not hard to see that the issues that have moved to the forefront of public concern - crime and healthcare - are integrally connected to the problem of drug use. While we, as a nation, have had some success in past years at decreasing the casual use of drugs, hardcore use continues unabated and, worse still, recent surveys indicate that our young may be increasing their use of drugs. Drug-related crime continues to plague our streets. We all see the tragic effects on the individuals whose lives are destroyed by drug use or drug-related violence, and we all feel the resulting strain on our local communities and our criminal justice and healthcare systems. The numbers are striking: 2.7 million Americans are chronic hardcore users; 10,000 Americans die because of drugs annually; and, illegal drug use drains our economy of tens of billions of dollars each year. In addition to the horrors inflicted by drugs in our own country, drug trafficking continues to threaten the integrity of Latin American democracies. Narcotraffickers have repeatedly used violence and corruption to try to undermine the legislatures, judiciaries, militaries, and police in Latin America. In Colombia alone, hundreds of innocent citizens have been killed and thousands injured by the drug cartels. Furthermore, there has been insufficient attention given to the ecological harms inflicted by the cultivation and processing of illegal drugs. Slash and burn farming techniques have been used to increase the production of coca and poppies, and the runoff of large quantities of precursor chemicals used to manufacture cocaine is polluting the environment. Given the complexity of the issues surrounding drug use, I have become convinced that there is a need for increased dialogue among the Defense Department, Congress, and the American people about the role of DOD in the counterdrug effort. When the Defense Department was drafted into the counterdrug effort in 1989, many people held out the hope that military involvement was the answer to our Nation's drug problem; the term "drug war" misleadingly implied that, with a concerted effort, the military could engage the enemy and bring victory. We must recognize that illicit drug use is a deepseated social problem which, like the problems of crime and inner-city poverty, will have to be addressed by all Americans over the long- term. As the President's recently announced National Drug Control Strategy indicates, the Federal counterdrug effort should involve multiple agencies cooperating to address the drug issue simultaneously on a variety of fronts. The Defense Department, with its unique assets and capabilities, has a critical, but supporting, role to play in that effort. Any assessment of DOD's contribution should be made in this context, and with an eye toward incremental progress. It is my belief that through effective strategic planning, and increased dialogue with the Congress and other Federal counterdrug agencies, we can better articulate reasonable expectations for the wide variety of counterdrug programs executed by DOD. Given that more than three times as much coca is currently produced than is needed to satisfy the U.S. demand for cocaine, it is not realistic to expect Federal supply reduction efforts to significantly limit the availability of cocaine in the near-term. There are, however, a number of goals that coordinated Federal efforts can be expected to achieve, including: disrupting the cocaine cartels, raising the costs of drug trafficking, and denying traffickers their preferred methods and routes, in particular the ability to fly directly into Florida and over the Southwest border. The Defense Department has contributed to significant successes in these areas. In 1993, DOD support activities led directly to the seizure of over 100 metric tons of cocaine that would otherwise have ended up on U.S. streets, and thereby denied traffickers the associated profits. During the last year I have taken a number of steps to more aggressively manage DOD's counterdrug programs and resources which previously had grown at an explosive rate. As you know, the DOD counterdrug budget rose from $380 million to $1.1 billion between Fiscal Years 1989 and 1993. Last summer, at my suggestion, the Department initiated an internal Comprehensive Review of DOD counterdrug activities that was conducted by a team consisting of representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Review Team evaluated the operational impact and cost- effectiveness of each of DOD's 170 counterdrug projects with respect to National objectives, and recommended $135 million in cuts to specific programs which were deemed of limited operational impact. When the DOD counterdrug budget was significantly reduced in the FY 94 Appropriation process, rather than allocate the undistributed reductions across the board, we directed cuts based on the findings of the Comprehensive Review. As a result, twenty-four programs that had been found to be of insufficient utility have been terminated. The level of funding for numerous other programs was decreased in favor of more cost- effective alternatives, while bringing the Department's activities in line with the priorities of the National Drug Control Strategy. This restructuring, which I will describe in more detail in a moment, has been implemented in FY 94 and is still being refined. The Department recommends continuing this strategy and programmatic initiative which is reflected in the FY 95 budget request. As a mechanism for analyzing the results of the restructuring, and in order to ensure that the level of accountability for DOD counterdrug expenditures continues to rise, I have established a working group of experts, with members from relevant divisions under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to serve as a quasi-Board of Directors for DOD counterdrug activities. This group will review counterdrug program effectiveness on an ongoing basis, and consider additional policy initiatives. I will now more specifically describe the policy and programs that DOD is implementing. Background As you are aware, DOD was given a number of counterdrug responsibilities in 1989. Specifically, DOD was: (1) assigned the lead role in the detection and monitoring of the air and maritime transport of illegal drugs; (2) tasked to integrate the command, control, communications, and tactical intelligence counterdrug assets of Federal agencies; and, (3) directed to approve and fund Governor's State Plans for National Guard counterdrug support efforts in each of the 54 states and territories. DOD has effectively executed and continues to execute each of these missions, developing an integrated DOD counterdrug program involving the operational activities of five supported CINCS. These activities have been in support of U.S. and Host Nation law enforcement agencies; DOD personnel have not engaged in direct law enforcement activities such as arrests and seizures. Impetus for Refocusing DOD Counterdrug Policy Despite the combined efforts of DOD and the other Federal agencies with counterdrug responsibilities, the flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute a critical threat to National security. The Clinton Administration has clearly articulated a multifaceted strategy for addressing the myriad of problems associated with illicit drug use. In both the Interim National Drug Control Strategy and the recently released 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, President Clinton has called for an integrated Federal effort with increased drug education, prevention and treatment, as well as renewed commitment to supply reduction activities. Domestically, supply reduction efforts are to give priority to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's) and are to be supported by increased funding for community policing. With respect to international supply reduction, the new National Strategy directs a controlled shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. In response to the new Presidential direction from the National Strategy, and incorporating the findings of our internal Comprehensive Review, the Department of Defense issued new counterdrug policy guidance in October, 1993. Signed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, the new guidance refocused DOD counterdrug policy around five strategic elements: (1) support to cocaine source nations; (2) intelligence support targeted toward dismantling cartels; (3) detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs; (4) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies, emphasizing the Southwest border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's); and (5) demand reduction. .1 will discuss the plans and objectives within each of these five strategic elements in a moment. It should be noted that while cocaine consumption continues to pose the greatest drug problem in the United States, and continues to be the top priority of the National Drug Control Strategy, the increasing supply and purity of heroin in the U.S. warrants increased attention. Colombia's role as a supplier of heroin in the Western Hemisphere is growing, and there are increasing reports of opium cultivation in Peru. DOD is committed to assisting increased law enforcement efforts aimed at heroin kingpins and their organizations. However, in light of the fragmented and complex nature of the heroin industry, any support provided by DOD must be applied judiciously. DOD is currently involved in an interagency process to review and strengthen our international heroin strategy which will result in recommendations submitted to the President for approval this year. New DOD Counterdrug Policy 1) Source Nation Support - The new National Strategy calls for increased support to those nations that demonstrate the political will to combat narcotrafficking. Specifically, DOD will focus its supporting efforts in the Andean countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Support will be aimed at strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty and ground-based endgame (effective arrest and prosecution) capabilities with the objective of moving these nations toward self-sustaining counterdrug programs. DOD will achieve these goals by providing, to the extent feasible and effective, consistent with law, training and operational support to source nation police and military units with counterdrug responsibilities through deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug funding -- primarily by utilizing authority under Section 1004 of the FY 91 National Defense Authorization Act as amended, and Sections 517 and 506(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. All source nation activities will be accomplished in cooperation with the Host Nations, and under the auspices of the U.S. State Department. As in the past, DOD personnel will be prohibited from engaging in, or accompanying Host Nation forces on, law enforcement operations. The Department understands the need for vigilant sensitivity to the danger of human rights abuses in the Andean region. For this reason all DOD training of Host Nation forces includes a human rights component. Furthermore, the Defense Department, in coordination with the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, has established standard operating procedures for end use monitoring of U.S.supplied equipment. Additionally, DOD has strengthened its end use monitoring practices by requiring all Department personnel who deploy to the field to verify the presence and use of U.S. supplied equipment at the unit or site they are visiting. In the last year U.S. efforts to bolster the political will and the enforcement capabilities of source nations have yielded encouraging results. One of the largest Peruvian drug traffickers, Demitrio Chavez Penaherra, aka "Vaticanon, was arrested in Colombia and expelled to Peru where he was prosecuted for narcotrafficking and treason; he is now serving a 30 year sentence. Moreover, the end of the eighteen-month pursuit of Pablo Escobar marked the demise of the once dominant Medellin cartel. Additionally, the government of Bolivia, in joint operations with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), dismantled four major cocaine trafficking organizations in 1993. No one is under any illusions that fighting drug traffic in the Andes is less complicated than it has ever been, but we should look to these recent successes as reasons for hope, and for lessons about what types of programs work. In addition to the DOD programs that directly assist source nation counterdrug efforts, a number of the programs which I'll describe below as part of other strategic elements of the DOD counterdrug policy also support U.S. objectives in the Andean region. It is important to understand that the DOD counterdrug policy is designed to support the multifaceted approach directed by the National Drug Control to exert pressure on the drug trade from a variety of angles simultaneously. 2) Dismantling the Cartels - Among the most cost-effective contributions which DOD can make to cooperative counterdrug efforts is bringing its intelligence capabilities to projects that target trafficking organizations. DOD is enhancing its support of the DEA's Kingpin Strategy and the Counterdrug Community's Kingpin Linear Approach which are specifically designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine business. DOD is also enhancing support to drug law enforcement agencies through the use of Section 1004 authority to provide translator and intelligence analyst support, and by expanding intelligence gathering and sharing programs. Additionally, the FY 95 budget request reflects DOD's funding for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). 3) Detection and Monitoring of the Transport of Illegal Drugs - DOD will support domestic law enforcement and host nation detection and monitoring efforts by: (a) emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; (b) streamlining activities in the transit zone (the region between the source countries and the U.S. border region), with detection and monitoring efforts focused toward intelligencecued operations that directly support the Kingpin Linear Approach and source country and arrival zone operations; and (c) refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize the cocaine threat at critical border locations. The use of more cost-effective technologies (such as relocatable- over-the-horizonradars (ROTHRs), and refitted TAGOS Radar Picket ships), in place of some of the more costly ship steaming and flying done in the past, is allowing DOD to maintain a robust and flexible detection and monitoring capability in the transit zone. The ROTHR operating in Chesapeake, Virginia, since early 1993 has provided promising results. The addition of a second ROTHR, scheduled to be operational in FY 95, will render more complete coverage of the transit area. Additionally, in FY 95 we hope to begin site preparation for a ROTHR in Puerto Rico that will improve coverage of the source nation area. 4) Direct Support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs)-Emphasizing the Southwest Border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas DOD will continue to directly support domestic DLEAs through: (a) a Detailee program that provides intelligence analysts, translators, and support personnel; (b) a program implementing Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, as amended, that provides transportation, maintenance, equipment upgrades and other forms of support; (c) a program implementing Section 1208 of the NDAA that provides excess DOD equipment to Federal, State and local DLEAS through four regional logistical support offices; and (d) the Governors' State Counterdrug Plans that use the National Guard to support DLEAs and drug demand reduction activities. DOD is developing comprehensive prioritization plans for requirements submitted under these programs, emphasizing the importance of efforts at the Southwest border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. If allowed by Congress, the Department will increase funding support for the Section 1004- program. In addition, DOD will continue to support Federal counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing multi-agency counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical intelligence problems. DOD is also aggressively pursuing a research and development program for cargo container inspection systems. The technologies being explored utilize very sophisticated X-ray and nuclear techniques and will be demonstrated at testbed sites in Otay Mesa, California, Tacoma, Washington, and at relocatable systems testbeds on the Southwest border. 5) Demand Reduction - All Military Department and Defense Agency drug testing and education programs will be continued, with an emphasis placed on increased regionalization, automation, and consolidation of testing. Additionally, DOD will continue the community outreach demand reduction pilot program directed by the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act. As part of the pilot study, each of the Military Departments and the National Guard are running programs which use military personnel as role models and target at-risk youth. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of these programs, and a report and accompanying recommendations will be sent to Congress this fall. These five strategic elements form the basis for a focused DOD counterdrug program which directly supports the National Drug Control Strategy. It is within this framework that we evaluate the efficacy of each of our many different projects. As discussed earlier, the reductions in the Department's FY 94 counterdrug budget were distributed in accordance with the findings of the Comprehensive Review; this was done with an eye toward achieving a balance among the five strategic areas that reflects the priorities of the National Strategy. The following charts show, by strategic area, how the budget distribution has evolved to fit the new policy guidance, with continuing refinements in the FY 95 request. Conclusion In summary, the Department's restructured counterdrug policy is well defined and directly supports the National Drug Control Strategy. In the last year DOD has significantly improved program management, and efforts to further enhance program effectiveness and increase accountability are underway. The Administration's budget request for FY 1995 Defense Department counterdrug activities represents 7% of the Federal counterdrug budget. At that funding level DOD will be able to continue to provide meaningful assistance to overburdened Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and crucial support to fragile democracies in Latin America. There can be no doubt of the harm illicit drugs inflict. While DOD does not have a "silver bullet" that could end the drug problem quickly, it does have unique talents and assets to bring to the interagency counterdrug effort. Internationally, DOD is engaged in operations that significantly strengthen the ability of foreign governments, particularly those in the Andean region, to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers. Domestically, the results of DOD counterdrug programs - from providing excess equipment to State police, to funding National Guard demand reduction programs for at risk youth, to detailing intelligence analysts to Federal agencies to prepare evidence for successful criminal prosecutions - impact communities around the country every day. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins (chugins@cup.hp.com) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268 ============================================================================= Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: chugins@cup.hp.com (Chris Hugins) Subject: Department of State's Response to the Latin American Narcotics Threat Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:23 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was sgastete@u.washington.edu ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:03:59 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Robert Gelbard Assistant Secretary Of State Department Of State House Foreign Affairs/International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere Statement Of Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters Robert Gelbard Before The House Foreign Affairs Committee June 22, 1994 - Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Department of State's response to the Latin American narcotics threat including our 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) and the President's certification decisions that were based on it. As you have requested, I will also discuss the President's counternarcotics strategy for the Western Hemisphere, including efforts to safeguard human rights, and our FY 1995 budget request. The 1994 INCSR is this Administration's first full public assessment of the global drug threat, and the President's April 1 certification underscores this Administration's response to that threat. The message is clear. President Clinton's approach to international drug control can be capsulized in five words': no more business as usual. Mr. Chairman, let there be no doubts: the Administration takes the problems of drug abuse and trafficking seriously. We are reminded daily by stories from Colombia, Mexico, Russia, and virtually every American community that the global narcotics trade is an insidious threat to America's domestic and foreign interests. It is an increasingly dangerous threat to democracy and sustainable development abroad, undermining the cornerstones of our policies to make America more secure and competitive in today's world. The effects on American society if we fail to address the narcotics problem abroad will be direct and unambiguous: more addiction, crime, violence, disease, and poverty. Assessment of the Narcotics Trade: Volatile but Vulnerable My first task after confirmation as the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters (INM) in November 1993 was to take a fresh look at the dimensions and implications of the foreign narcotics threat. President Clinton had just issued his counternarcotics directive instructing us to support those countries that demonstrate the political will and commitment to attack the drug problem. He also instructed the Department of State to apply stringent standards in the Congressionally- mandated certification process, a process that can result in the denial of assistance to countries that do not cooperate fully with the United States in counternarcotics or take adequate steps on their own. I have since traveled to Latin America, Asia, and Europe to talk with my counterparts, assess their efforts, and see our programs at work. My assessment is that the international narcotics trade is extremely volatile and continues to pose a grave danger to our foreign and domestic interests. The major international drug syndicates continue to target the U.S. market despite our intensified enforcement efforts in recent years. They are diversifying into other drugs and criminal activities, and are expanding their operations and markets to regions where political control is weak. We need greater international cooperation to overcome this threat. There are opportunities for advancing this objective, but current levels of cooperation and commitment are uneven at best. Focusing on Latin America, let me comment first on the cocaine situation. We made important gains last year, but they could be short-lived without stronger action by Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The good news: coca leaf production fell by 20 percent, the first decline that we have ever recorded. Virtually all of the reduction, however, occurred in Peru's Huallaga Valley as a consequence of a major fungus epidemic, declining soil fertility, and counternarcotics pressure on trafficker operations. Producers are already moving to restore supplies. Coca cultivation increased in Colombia and Bolivia, and Peruvian growers are responding to the disease by shifting cultivation to new areas. Latin American governments made important breakthroughs in attacking the cartels. Pablo Escobar--the last of Colombia's Medellin kingpins--is dead. His demise occurred not only because of outstanding work by the Colombian security forces, but also because, in the end, he had nowhere to flee--international concern had made him a virtual prisoner in his own country. "Vaticano," Peru's most notorious kingpin, was arrested in Colombia, expelled to Peru, and is now serving a lengthy sentence. Colombia's Cali cartel is meanwhile working hard to implement a legal and political strategy to thwart prosecutions by U.S. and Colombian authorities. They are seeking lenient plea bargain arrangements with Colombia's independent prosecutor and, even worse, trying to manipulate ambiguities in the revised Colombian criminal procedures that could be used to avoid punishment for serious drug crimes. We have sent a strong message to Colombia's President-elect Ernesto Samper that the crackdown on the Cali cartel must not falter if Colombia wants to sustain close relations with the United States. As pressure mounts on kingpins elsewhere, I predict that they will shift tactics to follow the pattern set by the Colombian cartel. That is, they will move from simply trying to bribe or intimidate key officials to a more comprehensive strategy aimed at permanently crippling the counternarcotics capabilities of the judicial and enforcement institutions. There is one sure way to thwart this tactic--building stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in key Latin American drug-producing and -transit countries. Latin America also poses an expanding heroin threat to the United States. There is good news in Mexico and Guatemala. Mexican production, the traditional threat, is being held in check through eradication and related enforcement programs. The Government of Mexico is accomplishing this on its own, having assumed in 1993 full responsibility for funding and managing the $20 million a year narcotics control program the State Department formerly administered there. INM's eradication program has also virtually eliminated poppy cultivation in Guatemala. Colombia's burgeoning heroin trade, however, offsets these accomplishments and presents us with one of our most dangerous drug control challenges. Seeking to diversify operations, Colombia's cocaine traffickers have moved rapidly into opium and heroin production. The Government of Colombia, with our help, is responding with a crop eradication program, but it still faces an uphill struggle. It is more important than ever that we integrate our narcotics control policies with other foreign policy objectives in Latin America. This need comes at a time of unprecedented movement toward democracy and economic reform in the region: military control has given way to civilian rule in country after country; participatory democracy is flourishing; corruption is under attack; and trade, investment, and economic growth are moving forward. But all of this is jeopardized if the narcotics trade is not controlled. Trafficker corruption and intimidation can turn legislatures, judiciaries, police, the media, and other democratic institutions into mere facades that provide cover for drug operations. The ability of traffickers to push Colombia to the brink of political chaos prior to its 1990 presidential elections and the virtually unobstructed influence they had at the highest levels of Panama's government before Operation Just Cause underscore the magnitude of this threat. Such situations are not only disastrous for host nations, they make it impossible for us to pursue important security, trade, commercial, and other regional and bilateral relations. New opportunities for counternarcotics progress are emerging in Latin America. Thanks to our leadership, governments are increasingly aware of the political, economic, and social threat drug trafficking poses to their societies. Democratic, market- oriented governments will be especially responsive. They are more likely to recognize the adverse effects of the drug trade and to have the political will and commitment to respond. Too many governments, however, continue to underestimate the risks and, consequently, are not taking sufficient steps on their own to address them. Through a combination of sticks, carrots, and new initiatives, our strategy is designed to encourage and help them take these steps. Mr. Chairman, this was the global context on which we based our certification recommendations to the President--and on which he made the final decisions--developed our Western Hemisphere strategy, and drafted our budget. These actions underscore the promise I made when I accepted this job: there would be no more business as usual on international narcotics policy. I meant it. In fact, I would not be in this position today if I did not believe it. We will be holding countries that receive our antidrug assistance increasingly accountable for their counternarcotics performance. Certification: No More Business as Usual One area where the President's new policy has had a strong impact is certification. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year the President identify the major drug-producing and drug-transit countries and determine whether they have fully cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on their own-in narcotics control. The United States must cut off most foreign assistance to those countries that are not certified and vote against their requests for loans from multilateral development banks. For countries found not to be fully cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the President may grant a national interest certification if the vital interests of the United States require continued provision of foreign assistance. On April 1, in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President issued his 1994 certification determination. This year's certifications are the toughest ever. Ten of 26 countries were either not certified or granted only a vital national interest certification. More countries than ever have been placed in these categories. This is double the number so categorized every year since 1990. Among these are not just "pariah" nations, but also countries with which we have strong bilateral interests. Three countries--Nigeria, Bolivia, and Peru--had never received anything less than full certification. Nigeria was denied certification for failing to take satisfactory action to curb blatant corruption and trafficking. Bolivia and Peru did not meet the requirements for "full" certification primarily because their efforts to attack coca cultivation were insufficient, but they were granted vital national interest certifications. Two countries--Panama and Laos--each of which had been denied certification before but had been fully certified in recent years, received vital national interest certifications. Panama has failed to address squarely its role in international money laundering, the most critical drug control problem in that country. Laos has not moved actively to establish its special police counternarcotics unit, nor did it sustain pressure--after successive years of decline--to reduce opium poppy cultivation in 1993. Of the remaining five countries, we gave a vital national interest certification to Lebanon, because it is in our vital interest that Lebanon continue to receive assistance aimed at promoting economic and political stability, and to Afghanistan. To deny certification to Afghanistan would undermine progress toward political stability which is essential for counternarcotics efforts. We continued to deny certification to Burma, Iran, and Syria. These were difficult decisions. They took into account a number of important U.S. foreign policy interests. Judging from their public reactions, some countries were clearly surprised. They apparently thought that performing at the previous year's levels would be sufficient. This is not what the law requires and they know it. Some may have thought they could impress us by stepping up efforts against less critical targets. Not so. We will not accept progress by a country against marginal targets as a substitute for neglecting the key drug issue. If a country is a money laundering center, we will expect progress against this problem; increased arrests of low-level couriers will not be sufficient. Countries that were fully certified should not relax. It is no more in their interests to relax their counternarcotics efforts than it is ours. Fully certified countries must continue to strengthen and improve their drug control programs. The goal of our "no more business as usual to approach is progress, not status quo. In making our recommendations to the President, we intend to continue strictly applying the statutory standards for certification. The fact that the President decided not to grant full certification to so many countries--several for the first time-- sends powerful narcotics control messages to foreign and domestic audiences alike: International narcotics control is a key foreign policy concern that the U.S. will put ahead of other bilateral interests if necessary. We will no longer accept weak excuses for inaction; countries know what we expect. We expect concrete results. After years of supplying assistance and building institutions, we now expect key countries to be more responsible for their own antidrug programs. We are going to cut waste from global drug control programs. If assistance is not being used effectively, it will be shifted elsewhere. Many countries where we have important narcotics bilateral interests will be electing new governments soon; these new governments should realize that narcotics control is at the top of our agenda. We do not seek to embarrass governments. We do not want to force them to adopt our standards. But we want certification to be an effective tool for securing greater international narcotics control and cooperation. I believe it will be. In fact, I have a simple message for the governments of the world, the American people, and the Congress: narcotics certification is an honest process. We obviously would prefer to make substantive progress through cooperative relationships rather than impose sanctions owing to a lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, this certification decision has given our international counternarcotics policy greater credibility. It is important to sustain this momentum. I have begun exploring, in Washington and at posts abroad, improved ways of keeping the attention of key drug countries focused on achieving concrete narcotics control goals. We are in the process of making demarches to these countries, highlighting critical areas of performance during the current certification cycle. I welcome a dialogue with this Committee on how the Legislative and Executive Branches can make the certification process more effective. A final point concerning certification legislation. As you are aware, if Congress does not act by September 1994, important provisions of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 will expire, eliminating several important improvements that have helped make certification a more effective counternarcotics tool. These improvements, codified in Sections 489 and 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act, have greatly improved the scope, objectivity, and efficiency of the drug reporting and certification processes. Before the deadline, we would like to see Congress retain these sections with only a few minor language changes we hope to provide soon to the Committee. Improved Strategy: Sharper Focus, Better Tactics The Administration is making new use of these instruments because it has a new international narcotics control strategy and policy. Both were developed to find a better and more cost- effective long-term solution to our drug problem and to ensure that our foreign counternarcotics objectives are integrated with our broader foreign policy goals of promoting democracy, sustainable development, and security around the world. Allow me to highlight the key elements of that strategy. First, we will support the development of stronger democratic counternarcotics institutions in countries that demonstrate a commitment to narcotics control. This is critical for convincing host governments to shoulder more of the drug control burden. Strong and accountable institutions are the foundation for an effective policy; they are essential for successful operations. The stronger the institutions, and the more responsive they are to public concerns and respectful of the rule of law, the less likely they are to succumb to the corrosive influence of narco- corruption and intimidation. We will put more emphasis on the cocaine source countries where the political and economic stakes are potentially higher and the trade is potentially more vulnerable. Strengthening the institutional base starts with enacting good drug control laws and then building the judicial, enforcement, and penal organizations to enforce them. This must include building respect for the rule of law and human rights. Administration of justice programs that serve both ourbroader democracy-building and our drug control objectives will be a major part of this effort. So too will be training and, in some countries, support to the military, with emphasis in both cases on human rights. Other important elements include public awareness and demand-reduction programs to alleviate the adverse social effects of the drug trade and to build public support for antidrug programs. Second, we will integrate our antidrug efforts with sustainable development programs, focusing on both macro and micro objectives. Strengthening the economies of key drug- producing and -transit countries creates economic alternatives to narcotics production and trafficking and increases the resources host nations can devote to narcotics control. Macro objectives are aimed at broad-based growth that expands income and employment alternatives throughout the economy and include such measures as balance of payments supports and other programs to generate foreign trade and investment. micro objectives-- targeted in and outside drug-producing areas--are important for ensuring that small producers have viable alternatives for narcotics crops. Such projects also help to facilitate eradication and other enforcement efforts by extending government authority and presence into drug-producing areas. Third, we will seek to involve multilateral and regional organizations in our counternarcotics programs and objectives. Multilateral organizations can complement our institution- building and sustainable development initiatives, operate where our access is limited, and attract additional international donors to the antidrug effort. We will increase support to our traditional UN partner--the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP)--and will continue to urge greater involvement by other UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP. We have recently undertaken the first-ever initiatives to engage international financial institutions and multilateral development banks in the counternarcotics effort. INM and AID have already held many meetings with the leadership of the World Bank and the Inter- American Development Bank to discuss how their programs can contribute to eliminating illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru. We will be coordinating with them more closely to ensure that their programs complement our counternarcotics and sustainable development objectives in host nations. Our fourth objective is to achieve more effective law enforcement operations against the kingpins and their organizations--a goal supported by institution-building and sustainable development initiatives which enhance the political will and ability of host nations to move in this direction. Although we have yet to see appropriately aggressive prosecution on significant kingpins in Colombia, recent enforcement operations in Colombia and other countries convince us that the kingpins and their organizations are now vulnerable to increased and enhanced host nation enforcement efforts. The institutional building blocks, USG support, and commitment are already in place to be more aggressive on this front. We intend to encourage greater regional and international cooperation, tougher action on chemical and money controls, adoption and implementation of aggressive and comprehensive asset forfeiture legislation, extraditions, and other measures to weaken the major organizations, and apprehend, convict, and incarcerate for appropriately severe terms of imprisonment, their leaders. Targeting the leadership of the cartels and their vast ill-gotten fortunes disrupts their entire organization, makes narcotics trafficking less profitable, and blunts the effects of corruption and intimidation, the most dangerous drug-related threats to democratic political systems. Success will depend on securing the commitment of foreign governments to set their drug enforcement sights on the kingpins. It will be achieved through good intelligence and police work and not necessarily through the constant application of high-cost technology as has been the case with interdiction. Human Rights I am aware of how the human rights issue is connected to the narcotics control assistance we provide to foreign police and military units. Fortunately, we have rarely found human rights abuses in our counter-narcotics programs, but we remain concerned. As I have already emphasized, a major thrust of our institution-building initiatives is to strengthen respect for human rights. Accordingly, we have established several mechanisms to minimize the potential for violations and to identify them and take corrective actions quickly when they occur. In Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, U.S. Embassies screen individuals for counternarcotics training, target assistance specifically for antidrug units, and monitor ongoing operations for possible abuses. We are in the process of establishing mechanisms to screen units prior to delivering counternarcotic's assistance. Meanwhile, I work closely with the Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to monitor and respond to allegations of human rights abuses by government forces that may receive funding, training, or other support from U.S. Government counternarcotics programs. Assistant Secretary Shattuck and I co-chair an interagency working group to address these problems and recently agreed to instruct our military group in Colombia to add more aggressive human rights monitoring to its end- use-monitoring mission for equipment and assistance provided to the Colombian military. INM recently discussed our Colombia initiatives with Amnesty International representatives. Our Embassies in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have human rights working groups that mirror our efforts in Washington to identify and resolve human rights abuses. In addition, AID programs that advance drug control objectives, such as justice system reform in Colombia and Bolivia, also include mechanisms to protect human rights. The bottom line is that our counternarcotics assistance can be a powerful force in advancing, rather than retarding, human rights objectives in the hemisphere. Our training and oversight help instill respect for human rights and professionalism among police and military commanders in the host countries, a fact underscored by the virtual absence of confirmed human rights violations by counternarcotics forces. Moreover, it is through the provision of assistance that we can conduct end use monitoring and in that way keep an eye on the human rights performance of these forces. Indeed, in many ways, the narcotics kingpins, whom these commanders and their forces are trying to subdue, pose a far more fundamental threat to human rights. This is evident in the way narco-traffickers have terrorized the press, corrupted local police forces, and paralyzed the judiciary. We will remain vigilant, but I believe that a withdrawal of our counternarcotics support could be a setback for human rights. Budget Support Mr. Chairman, the President's counternarcotics strategy recognizes that we must operate within tight budgets. This is why it stresses the need to concentrate resources and pursue operations more efficiently and effectively than in the past. INM, with its program focus on institution-building and long experience in the source countries, developed its FY 1995 counternarcotics budget request for $232 million with these principles in mind. Let me assure you that we have used fiscal restraint in planning our programs. Our FY 95 request reflects a new consolidated budget that includes for the first time the traditional INM account ($152 million) as well as funds that were formerly provided through counternarcotics economic (ESF) and military (FMF) security assistance and International Military Education and Training (IMET) accounts. Of the $232 million total, approximately $205 million is for Latin American and Caribbean programs. The $232 million is less than what we had requested in FY 94 and over $100 million less than what we received in FY 93. The House recently voted out an appropriations bill that frankly jeopardizes our programs and policy. The traditional INM account was broken out and cut to $115 million, marginally more than last year. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out last week an INM budget of only $100 million. Cuts in our overall request for economic and military assistance are likely to force us to reduce further our counternarcotics assistance. We are surviving on our drastically reduced FY 94 budget by drawing on the prior-year pipeline, deferring upgrades and improvements, and seeking augmentations from ONDCP and DoD. We have cut most overseas programs to the core. A continuation at the $115 million level will have serious consequences. Scaling back source country programs: INM will be faced with reducing its plans for sustainable development initiatives in Bolivia and Peru, weakening our efforts to strengthen the political and economic underpinnings for their counternarcotics commitment and performance. We would curb aviation support to the Andes, causing large cutbacks in police operations. Closing programs: we would make deep cuts in transit country programs, possibly closing some operations completely. Judicial enhancement, intelligence collection and sharing, and interdiction operations would suffer. Stopping eradication initiatives At $115 million, we will not be able to sustain the recent momentum that has overcome major hurdles in winning greater host nation commitment to eradication. Colombia will not be able to keep pace with poppy production and will have to delay its new coca eradication efforts. Setbacks in Colombia will cause recent progress to strengthen the political will of the governments of Bolivia and Peru to falter. Gutting aviation support:. We are abiding by Congress's wishes that we get out of the air force business. We have already reduced our air wing from 62 to 48 aircraft. The budget cuts, however, would force us to make deeper reductions than planned, forcing us to either mothball aircraft or turn them over to host countries before they are fully capable of receiving or maintaining them. Diverting funds from other Priorities: To save what we can of the Andean programs, we would have to divert funding from other priority programs such as international heroin control and our new initiatives to address the organized crime threats from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. I do not mean to sound alarmist, but I do mean to inform the Committee that a $115 million budget will have practical consequences for U.S. international counternarcotics efforts. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend that there is an easy solution to the global narcotics problem. I am here to say, however, that the stakes in terms of America's security and welfare are too high for us to abandon"or disengage from the international narcotics control effort. The President has altered our approach. The increasingly dangerous nature of the threat, new opportunities, and current funding realities require it. our new approach does more than sustain pressure; it attacks at the criminal, economic, and political heart of the trade and raises the stakes against those who oppose or obstruct our efforts. We have built this strategy on lessons learned. We have enough evidence to know that it can work if given time and support, and that the consequences are dire if it is allowed to fail. I look forward to working closely with the Members of this Committee on our counternarcotics objectives and seek your support in ensuring that we have adequate funds to meet these objectives. We must avoid making cuts that will starve the President's strategy to death in its first year and leave the United States without a coherent, supportable international narcotics control strategy. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins (chugins@cup.hp.com) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268 ============================================================================= Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: chugins@cup.hp.com (Chris Hugins) Subject: Programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the Americas Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:51 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was sgastete@u.washington.edu ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:07:09 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY HEADLINE: TESTIMONY JUNE 22, 1994 THOMAS CONSTANTINE ADMINISTRATOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE Statement of Thomas A. Constantine Administrator The Drug Enforcement Administration United States Department of Justice for House Foreign Affairs Committee U.S. House of Representatives Concerning International Narcotic Control Programs June 22, 1994 Chairmen Torricelli and Lantos, Members of the Subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in this hemisphere. I appreciate this chance to speak about some of the important challenges we face in our international programs. I have been the Administrator of DEA for three months now, and in that short time I have recognized the need for us to put the international programs into a better perspective in relation to our overall domestic drug enforcement effort. I think we frequently lose sight of how our international programs go hand in hand with what we are doing within our borders, and today I'd like to talk about some important cases and DEA efforts which link the international and domestic aspects of our drug control mission. Violent crime has changed the face of America during the past decade. You cannot turn on the evening news without hearing reports of gun violence or vicious crimes against innocent children. Neighborhoods are no longer safe; even where I come from in upstate New York, many people will not leave their homes after dark, or walk down the street to buy a loaf of bread. The links between drugs and violent crime is sometimes overlooked, but it is real and still a central issue for us to deal with. Before 1985, violent crime was actually decreasing after a significant increase during the sixties and seventies. The appearance of crack cocaine in 1985 dramatically changed the landscape of crime and the criminal justice system in our country. This drug, as you know, spawned violence and addiction, tragedies we are living with every day. My assessment is that our current violent crime wave will remain with us for the foreseeable future. Demographics for the coming decades indicate that by the year 2005, the number of young people aged 15-19 will increase by 25 percent. Because young men aged 1824 are twice as likely to commit crimes as men over 25, we could continue to see significant rates of violent crime well into the next century. We must break the cycle of drug trafficking and drug abuse if we are to survive this crime wave. I think we can do that, but it will require us --- the American people and our government --- to establish sound policies and to stick with them for the long haul. This will require both domestic and international efforts which are built upon programs that work and have shown results. For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's efforts to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations. We will continue to aggressively pursue traffickers who operate around the globe. As Administrator, I intend to continue DEA's important global mission, keeping the following principles as guiding our actions in the coming years: First, that we must recognize that cocaine and heroin have foreign sources and the world's major trafficking organizations are headquartered in foreign countries. Other nations have international obligations to address the issues of drug production and trafficking. DEA will continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build institutions, share intelligence and make cases which have an impact on drug trafficking in the United States. Concurrently, we will enhance our domestic efforts, as well, balancing both foreign and domestic programs. That however, does not mean that we are lessening our pressure on the ma or traffickers in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, but rather, that we will increase our attention on the surrogates that operate within our borders. Second, that resources for international programs must be dedicated intelligently and strategically, allowing DEA the flexibility to act quickly as new threats and opportunities arise. Third, that we have an obligation to the American people to enhance the quality of life in our communities across the nation. DEA has a major role to play in removing violent traffickers, who have a direct link to the degradation of life in our communities, from neighborhoods, and reducing the amount of drugs trafficked in our cities and towns. Fourth, that heroin is a major concern to us, and international and domestic programs must be developed to address this problem before it becomes any more serious. I intend to use these principles to formulate DEA's contribution to the international strategy, articulated in Presidential Decision Directive 14, which was signed by President Clinton last November. This Directive states that "the United States will treat as a serious national security threat the operations of international criminal syndicates" and will assist those nations demonstrating the political will necessary to fight narcotics trafficking. I'd like to take a few minutes to discuss with you some developments which have led to these assumptions. Major Traffickers and their Surrogates: Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being shipped to new European markets, the U.S. continues to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel maintains a lock on much of the U.S. cocaine supply. This organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on cocaine producers and transporters in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, other Central American nations, and the United States. It also staffs distribution organizations in the major cities of the United States with Colombians who subcontract with street organizations in these cities. DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in the U.S. : targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and eliminating their surrogates' operations in the United States. It is critical to gather enough information on the major cartel leaders for indictments in the event that they will be brought to justice in the U.S. That, however, is less of a possibility today than it was prior to Colombian constitutional prohibition on the extradition of nationals. Nevertheless, DEA continues to put pressure on the cartels by interfering with their money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications --- all the means that are critical to their operations. During the past year, DEA, working with other U.S. agencies and with counterparts in Andean and Central American nations, made significant inroads into the cocaine trade in this hemisphere. Some of these include: Medellin cartel leaders were either jailed or killed. Pablo Escobar and Juan Camilo ZAPATA-Vasquez were killed in shootouts with the Colombian National Police. Fabio OCHOA was sentenced to an eight year prison term. A major Peruvian trafficker, Demetrio CHAVEZ-Penaherrera (aka VATICANO) was arrested in Cali and expelled to Peru where he is now serving a thirty year prison sentence. Julio Fabio URDINOLA-Grajales, the brother of Ivan Urdinola, one of Colombia's major money launderers, surrendered to Colombian authorities in March. On September 2, 1993, Jaime Garcia-Garcia, whose organization provided major transportation services for a number of major Colombian traffickers, was arrested by Colombian authorities; he is presently incarcerated. Prior to his arrest, in June 1993, one of Garcia's former associates Joaquin Guzman-Loera, was arrested in Guatemala on the El Salvador border. Seizures included major loads in Guatemala (6.6 MT), Mexico (33.1 MD, OPBAT (2.2 MT) and Peru (8,900 kg). Several other former leaders of the Medellin cartel remain incarcerated. Of equal importance to DEA are accomplishments which have a direct effect on U.S. cocaine supplies and operations within our borders. Most cases have both international and domestic elements, and many could not have been undertaken successfully without the involvement of our overseas offices. A few examples: A New York-based Dominican Ramon Valasquez was transporting Colombian cocaine through Mexico into New York. An informant arranged to transport 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Mexico thru Texas into New York. The cocaine was delivered back to Colombians in New York, where it was seized. Valasquez worked with Mexican transporters, Colombians in New York and Mexicans in Texas. A Colombian cocaine trafficker/money launderer who imported cocaine from Colombia to Mexico to New Jersey, used car dealerships in both Los Angeles and Phoenix, Arizona to facilitate distribution. In June 1992, 800 kilograms of cocaine transported in a R.V. was seized in Phoenix, Arizona, and 8 individuals were arrested. The Colombian trafficker is currently a fugitive. DEA/Tucson targeted a Mexican transportation group based in Agua Prieta Sonora, Mexico. This group transported Colombian cocaine and Mexican marijuana. A six-month wiretap investigation, which monitored 19 telephones and intercepted radio mobile telephone communications, resulted in the indictment of 108 defendants in the U.S. and Mexico, as well as the seizure of 4,000 pounds of marijuana, 200 kilograms of cocaine, and $3.5 million in assets. DEA/Houston targeted Colombians and Mexicans transporting Colombian cocaine into Houston. The organization utilized "trapped" vehicles, which were loaded with cocaine in Colombia and driven through Guatemala and Mexico and into Texas. The money was smuggled back to Colombia in the same fashion. The cocaine smuggled into Houston was further distributed in New York, Chicago and Louisiana. In November, 1993, as a result of a lookout placed by the Santiago, Chile Country Office, the Newark Field Division of DEA seized 606 kilograms of cocaine from containers shipped from Chile. Through wire intercepts, pen registers and surveillance, earlier this month (June 1-2), DEA seized 150 kilograms of cocaine, $600,000 and numerous documents connected to a cocaine trafficking organization related to Ivan Urdinola and other major traffickers in Miami, New York and Houston. 32 people were arrested, including a cell manager for the Houston area. Prior enforcement action taken in this investigation in Miami, Houston, and New York resulted in the arrest of over 18 suspects, and the seizure of 5 pounds of Colombian heroin, nearly 1,470 kilograms of cocaine, and over $15 million. DEA depends heavily on the use of court-ordered wiretaps to intercept conversations in pursuit of making cases against the cartel members. These Title 3's are costly and manpower intensive since most of the conversations are in Spanish and must be translated into English. Last year, Title 3's agency-wide cost over $14 million; this year's cost is projected to be about $17 million. A major Nigerian heroin trafficking organization was documented in August 1993 with the arrest of two Nigerians in Bangkok, Thailand. Extradition proceedings are pending against each of these individuals, who face heroin importation charges in New Jersey. This investigation also developed intelligence that led to indictments in the Northern District of California, District of Florida, and District of Minnesota for separate multi- kilogram importations of heroin into the United States. Additional intelligence and evidence to support prosecutions of American- based members of this organization in the Eastern and Northern District of New York was also developed. The investigation confirmed that this Nigerian trafficking organization operated in Southeast Asia, utilized New Jersey based West Africans, and imported multiple kilograms of heroin annually into the United States. The organization utilized international monetary transfers to facilitate this importation and to disburse the proceeds. In addition, the organization was also responsible for supplying secondary distribution organizations operating in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic and Midwest areas of the United States. The intemational-domestic links between major cocaine organizations and the street-level drug trade in the United States are well illustrated by a case I'm familiar with from my days as Superintendent of the New York State Police. The Herrera family, with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a cell in New York City. The cell head was Helmer Herrera, brother of the cartel head. (The Herrera organization's annual profits were three times those of DEA's yearly budget.) All decisions carried out in the United States were made in Colombia --which phone numbers to use, which loads to move, what to pay workers. Detailed records on salaries, family history of workers and consignments of cocaine were kept. This was the cocaine which ended up in the suburbs of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, the cocaine which was ultimately distributed by violent street gangs. DEA, working with the New York State Police, dismantled this cell and seized records, computer disks and money. 100 arrests were made, 22 of which were principal defendants. After a disruption of several months, another cell resumed operations and there was no ultimate reduction in cocaine supplies in New York. What this case proves is the fact that both ends of the cocaine trade must be vigorously pursued. Players on both ends are replaceable, and the pressure must be kept up at the high, middle and low ends of the trade. While Pacho Herrera heads the arm of the cocaine organization doing part of the cocaine business in New York City, it is the violent street gangs who shoot children in the public housing complex in Washington Heights. It's critical to get them off the street too. We are at an important junction in our drug strategy. At a time when resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance programs are tight, we are having to balance the need to protect Americans from crime in our streets with our international obligations to our overseas partners in the drug fight. As the Administrator of DEA, I am reviewing both our domestic and international programs to determine how we can make better use of our resources. I expect that with the advice and input of DEA's senior management, we will be streamlining some of our international efforts in order to ensure that our programs contribute to the overall drug strategy which has both domestic and international components. The Need to Balance International and Domestic Programs: Building on the premise that we must balance our domestic enforcement programs and our international efforts, I would like to discuss some of the obstacles we must overcome to be successful in our international programs. The reality is that major traffickers have intimidated or subomed various police and government officials, enabling them to continue operating. There are limits on what the United States can expect foreign nations to do, given the fact that many of these nations do not control large areas where drug production and trafficking take place. We have more leverage in some places than in others; in a country like Burma, the source of most of the world's opium, we have almost none. We cannot influence Colombia's Constitutional Court, which recently held that possession and use of small amounts of certain drugs are constitutionally protected in Colombia, nor can we control government officials who advocate more liberal drug policies in Colombia. We can, and do, use the Presidential certification process to send strong signals to other nations to comply with their international obligations to reduce drug production and trafficking, and in some cases, the message is heard loud and clear. The President's decision not to certify Nigeria has certainly gotten that government's attention. International programs are an important component of our overall strategy which must be viewed through the prism of reality. We must not abandon or significantly scale back these programs. But, we cannot expect them to solve our drug problem or eliminate drug trafficking and abuse from our nation. DEA will absolutely continue to support institution building in other nations as we implement the President's directive. Working with the Colombian National Police, we have been able to help them enhance their law enforcement operations aimed against production and transportation networks in more remote regions of Colombia. We have also been able to increase the Bolivian Government's capabilities in managing, assessing and disseminating drug intelligence information. DEA has been instrumental in improving the ability of law enforcement organizations in Mexico, El Salvador and Argentina, to cite some examples. Regarding DEA programs, such as Snowcap, we will ensure that the role of DEA is to train and provide liaison with host-country enforcement organizations. As host countries gradually become more sophisticated and capable in their law enforcement programs, there will be less of a need for DEA to play a direct operational role. During 1993, 2,383 officers from 45 countries have been trained in basic and advanced drug enforcement by DEA. Of particular note is our work with officials from the Newly Independent States whose nations are now confronting a serious drug problem. Later this month, I will be traveling with FBI Director Freeh and (State) INM Assistant Secretary Robert Gelbard to Russia and several Eastern European countries to assess their needs as these countries address crime and drugs. I have asked DEA's top management to take a look at our international programs, including Operation Snowcap, and report back to me on whether these programs should continue as currently structured. I believe that our commitments to some of these programs should not be limitless, given budget and staffing realities. DEA will continue to participate as a full partner in our international programs, but we need to be more conscious of costs and results than we have in the past. Heroin: I am deeply concerned about the increased availability and dramatically increased purity in heroin in the United States. Worldwide production of opium rose from 2,580 metric tons in 1988 to 3,699 metric tons in 1993. Most of this production occurred in Afghanistan and Burma, where the central government does not control the growing areas. In addition, analysis of data from DEA's Domestic Monitor Program shows street- level purity continuing to rise. Heroin purity in the United States has increased from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1992. With the increase in heroin availability and purity levels, we have also seen a continued rise in the number of heroin-related emergency room drug abuse episodes, especially in Seattle, Newark and San Francisco. Of special concern is the fact that traffickers in Colombia are cultivating opium and producing heroin. Despite the Colombian government's herbicidal eradication program, there are about 20,000 hectares of opium under cultivation. This makes Colombia the world's third largest source of opium poppy. From an enforcement standpoint, we are also concerned because Colombia has in place sophisticated trafficking networks which could readily diversify into heroin trafficking. During the coming months, DEA, as part of the Administration's review of heroin programs, will be developing heroin strategies to address the myriad heroin threats from Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Nigerian traffickers and the Colombian organizations now producing and trafficking heroin. We must vigorously confront this threat by focusing the operational resources of all international intelligence and law enforcement agencies on attacking the infrastructure and leadership of these trafficking organizations. We must identify and attack the weaknesses in these organizations and disrupt their financial operations, as well as arrest, prosecute and imprison those responsible. This will take a concerted effort by the international community to address this renewed threat from an old enemy. Flexibility to meet new opportunities and threats: DEA must remain flexible and innovative in addressing the challenges posed by international drug traffickers. In order to respond fully to both the domestic and international aspects of the drug problem, we must have the necessary resources required to address this national threat. These international drug organizations are well- financed, with connections throughout the United States and abroad. Therefore, DEA must be in a position to move quickly to address emerging threats after having identified opportunities for meaningful actions. In closing, I again want to thank the Chairmen for this opportunity to discuss DEA's international programs with you today. I know that the coming months hold much challenge for me personally and for DEA as an agency. I will be happy to answer any questions you, or others on the Committee may have. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins (chugins@cup.hp.com) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268